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ABSTRACT  
   
Professional environmental scientists are increasingly under pressure to 
inform and even shape policy. Scientists engage policy effectively when they act 
within the bounds of objectivity, credibility, and authority, yet significant portions 
of the scientific community condemn such acts as advocacy. They argue that it is 
nonobjective, that it risks damaging the credibility of science, and that it is an 
abuse of authority. This means objectivity, credibility, and authority deserve 
direct attention before the policy advocacy quagmire can be reasonably 
understood. I investigate the meaning of objectivity in science and that necessarily 
brings the roles of values in science into question.  
This thesis is a sociological study of the roles environmental values play in 
the decisions of environmental scientists working in the institution of academia. I 
argue that the gridlocked nature of the environmental policy advocacy debates can 
be traced to what seems to be a deep tension and perhaps confusion among these 
scientists. I provide empirical evidence of this tension and confusion through the 
use of in depth semi-structured interviews among a sampling of academic 
environmental scientists (AES). I show that there is a struggle for these AES to 
reconcile their support for environmentalist values and goals with their 
commitment to scientific objectivity and their concerns about being credible 
scientists in the academy. Additionally, I supplemented my data collection with 
environmental sociology and history, plus philosophy and sociology of science 
literatures. With this, I developed a system for understanding values in science (of 
   ii 
which environmental values are a subset) with respect to the limits of my sample 
and study. 
This examination of respondent behavior provides support that it is 
possible for AES to act on their environmental values without compromising their 
objectivity, credibility, and authority. These scientists were not likely to practice 
this in conversations with colleagues and policy-makers, but were likely to behave 
this way with students. The legitimate extension of this behavior is a viable route 
for continuing to integrate the human and social dimensions of environmental 
science into its practice, its training, and its relationship with policy. 
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DEDICATION  
   
This is dedicated to everyone doing good things with what time they have.
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Do environmental values play roles in the decisions of academic 
environmental scientists?1 If they do, what roles do they play? Furthermore, what 
can be gained by studying how environmental values function in the decisions of 
academic environmental scientists (AES)? This linked triad of questions 
motivates and structures this thesis. The benefits of research on this topic are clear 
given the protracted history of policy advocacy debates in conservation biology, 
ecology, and other environmental sciences.  
In these debates scientists reveal how they understand what science is and 
what it is supposed to do (Kaiser, 2000; Wallington & Moore, 2005; Pielke, 2007; 
Neff, 2011) through their use of archetypical arguments for and against policy 
advocacy (Nelson & Vucetich, 2009). When scientists understand objectivity 
differently they understand science differently, and consequentially the role of 
science in society differently. Environmental scientists are subject to semantic 
confusion (Lackey, 2007) like any other human endeavor, but they are 
increasingly under pressure to contribute to policy making (Pielke, 2007) at a time 
thought to be pivotal for the survival of life on Earth (Barry & Oelschlaeger, 
1996; Vitousek, A., Lubchenco, & Melillo, 1997; Lubchenco, 1998; Wilson, 
2002).  
                                                 
1
 An environmental scientist is difficult to define. Bocking (2006) treats 
the science itself as “diverse and diffuse... the boundaries of which are always 
open to negotiation” (p. 15). I construct my working definition on p. 44-45 after 
introducing my respondents. 
   2 
This addition of pressure further supports the merit of sociologically 
investigated how AES perceive, treat, and use values (of which environmental 
values are a subset) in their professional and personal lives. In this thesis I seek to 
build an understanding of how AES comprehend the complex relationship among 
values, scientific objectivity, credibility, authority, and advocacy. It is important 
to understand how AES think about environmental values and advocacy, 
including how they determine when it is acceptable (or required) in their work. 
This inquiry benefits from a sociological approach because its empiricism helps 
describe and inform the debates over values in science and policy advocacy that 
often take place at a more conceptual or philosophical level.  
The results presented in this thesis are the product of this kind of 
sociological study of environmental values and their roles in the decisions of a 
sample of AES. Specifically, I interviewed nineteen professors of science with 
training or experience in ecology, conservation biology, sustainability, and certain 
types of engineering. I structured our conversations around research selection 
motivations, academic employment, objectivity’s relationships to credibility and 
authority, and policy engagement behaviors. This often led to discussing the 
environmental movement, the importance of mentoring students, and 
developments in the practice and in the philosophy of science. 
Research into the values actually held by scientists seems useful for 
advancing the debate over advocacy, objectivity, and credibility in the 
environmental sciences, and for improving the ability of scientists to contribute to 
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environmental problem solving. Environmental scientists and their science are 
less able to effectively contribute to policy decision-making and to its politics 
until open discussions about how values are embedded in science are had in a 
more explicit and transparent manner. Exploring how values are understood and 
function in the scientific enterprise can improve the quality of discussion found in 
the environmental science policy advocacy debates by putting the science in its 
human and social context (Barry & Oelschlaeger, 1996; Allchin, 1999; Robinson, 
2006; Pielke, 2007; Meyer, Frumboff, Hamburg, & de la Rosa, 2010). As 
Sarewitz (2004) argues, “Bringing the value disputes concealed by—and 
embodied in—science into the foreground of political process is likely to be a 
crucial factor in turning such controversies into successful democratic action.... 
Moreover, the social value of science itself is likely to increase if scientific 
resources relevant to a particular controversy are allocated after these value 
disputes have been brought out into the open, their implications for society 
explored, and suitable goals identified” (p. 399). 
I organized this thesis into a series of chapters that 1) provide a historical 
and intellectual context for how the changing practices of environmentalism and 
academic science are influencing the worldviews of AES, 2) illustrate how the 
AES are handling these changes through the examination of two recent policy 
advocacy debates, 3) develop and describe my sociological methods for studying 
the views these scientists, and 4) present and discuss the results of interviews 
conducted with nineteen AES.  
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Chapter two examines how AES are conflicted and perhaps confused 
about how to reconcile their support of environmental values with the 
development and maintenance of scientific credibility in the academy. I provide 
brief backgrounds of American environmentalism and academic science and show 
how their practices and conceptual foundations are changing the content of their 
narratives. To illustrate what these changes are like in practice I review examples 
of the policy advocacy debates in two top tier environmental science journals. I 
end the chapter by explaining the framework of values I use to discuss and 
analyze my results. In chapter three I describe my methodological approach of 
using grounded theory to gather data by conducting interviews and I introduce the 
structure of the results that I present and discuss in chapter four.  
I conclude my study by suggesting that AES can operate successfully and 
legitimately with respect to environmentalism and academic science by acting on 
their environmental values without compromising their objectivity, credibility, 
and authority. This dual orientation may enhance meaningful and effective policy 
engagement. Ultimately, I argue that AES can benefit from discussing and 
interrogating their understanding of environmental values more explicitly and 
integrate these commitments into their emerging community’s scientific work. 
My sociological study of environmental values held by a sample of AES and an 
analysis of their attitudes toward policy advocacy also suggests that it is well 
within the reach of AES to incorporate environmental values more openly in their 
research and professional activities.  
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Chapter 2 
THE ENVIRONMENT OF VALUES IN ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENTAL 
SCIENCE 
In this chapter I provide a brief overview of environmentalism and 
academic science in America in order to develop my argument for what the 
sources of tension and possible confusion are for academic environmental 
scientists (AES). I review (in summary fashion) their historical development and 
describe how the practice and philosophical foundations of environmentalism and 
academic science are changing in response to accusations of inaccurately 
portraying what it is that they do. Following this, I illustrate these issues by 
analyzing analyze two policy advocacy debates published in the journals 
Conservation Biology and Frontiers in Ecology and Environment. I end this 
chapter by laying the groundwork for how I handle discussions of value 
throughout the rest of this thesis.  
 
Changes in Environmentalism  
 Earth Day, April 22, 1970 represents the moment in time when the 
American environmental movement became a social force to be reckoned with, 
and one of increasing interest to policy makers (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007; 
Stone, 2009; Dunlap, 1992). Nationwide, twenty million people reportedly 
participated in teach-ins, rallies, and protests (Dunlap, 1992). The key organizer 
of the event, Denis Hayes, reflected the image of many of the participants with his 
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youth and his grassroots approach to education. Many of the early movement’s 
participants were inspired by ideas captured in key environmental works such as 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), Paul Ehrlich’s Population Bomb (1968), 
and Aldo’s Leopold’s earlier Sand County Almanac (1949), a paperback copy of 
which was released in the late 1960s and which would turn into the 
“environmentalist’s bible” (Duffy, 2004; Stone, 2009). The common thread 
among these iconic literary works is not only the subject matter—i.e., man’s 
detrimental relationship with nature is in need of a transformation— it is also the 
manner in which textual authority derives from each author’s scientific expertise 
in the construction of their arguments (Bocking, 2006; Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 
2007).  
People armed with scientific knowledge stood witness to the polluted 
Cuyahoga River burning in 1969 and decided something had to be done 
(Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, p. 21, 27-29). The first image of Earth from 
space was taken the same year and this reinforced the uptake of new beliefs and 
environmental values (Stone, 2009; Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, p. 21, 24). 
Humility mingled with horror and with the first Earth Day came hope: one logical 
recourse was political change. The passing of the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) in 1969 made it the cornerstone of U.S. environmental law and 
policy. The following decade saw the enactment of thirteen major federal 
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environmental policies aimed at protecting nature from society’s pollution.2 
Grassroots movements and science coalesced, forming and then catapulting 
environmentalism as a social movement into successful political action with “save 
the earth” as its motto (Dunlap, 1992; Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007; Stone, 
2009). 
Narratives become easy to grasp as they simplify societal and 
environmental complexity and reduce these forces into less complicated accounts. 
In Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger’s Break Through: From the Death of 
Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility, the environmental movement’s 
“political fable” is deconstructed and reconstructed in attempts to rid society of 
the “albatross [called] the politics of limits” (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, p. 
22, 17). Nordhaus and Shellenberger recognize that the well-packaged stories of 
the 1960s and 70s energized people to support environmental policy development; 
the narrative served its purpose. However, it imprinted within us an incomplete (if 
not false) story rife with fundamental concepts that, they argue, we must overhaul 
or jettison if we are to achieve a more progressive and sustainable social and 
environmental order. 
Take, for example, the Cuyahoga River. It caught fire more than a dozen 
times in the hundred years prior to 1969. Up until this event industrial river fires 
were somewhat of a socially tolerated annoyance. In fact, the now iconic 
                                                 
2
 The Environmental Protection Agency’s history website 
http://www.epa.gov/history/ (accessed 3/15/2012) and the National Resource 
Defense Council’s legislature website http://www.nrdc.org/reference/laws.asp 
(accessed 3/15/2012). 
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newspaper picture of Cuyahoga burning was shot during the fire of 1952 
(Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, p. 23). Nordhaus and Shellenberger argue that 
it was not simply the fire igniting environmentalist concerns, but people using the 
“visual imagery [as] a kind of nostalgia masquerading as political strategy” to 
ignite environmentalism and imbue it with political advocacy (p. 24).  
Citizens across the nation idealized how nature used to be before man 
polluted it and grew nostalgic. Seeing Earth from outer space for the first time 
buttressed this nostalgia of a pristine planet. Such worldviews do not 
accommodate rivers on fire or springtime without birds or man as part of nature. 
Rather, the programmed worldview of environmentalism held that people interact 
with nature largely by contaminating it with pollution, so pollution and people 
must be regulated in order to protect nature. As Stephen Bocking argues in 
Nature’s Experts (2006), “Several of the most serious environmental problems... 
were only recognized as problems once scientists had described them” (p. 4) 
which allows scientists “privileged access to the political system, where they 
shape both policies and their implementation, framing definitions of what is and is 
not feasible” (p. 22). Scientists as quantifiers of scope and environmental 
problems theorize the ramifications successful policy change intended to avoid. 
“Environmentalists have often drawn on scientists authority,” (p. 23) in part 
because defining these decisions as scientific “discourage[s] potential opponents,” 
(p. 22) and because it “implies... regulation of industry activities” (p. 23). But, it 
is recognized that the science did not dictate the policies, rather, “these policies 
   9 
were a response to a wave of popular support that reflected evolving aesthetic, 
ideological, and ethical perspectives about the preservation of nature” (Sarewitz, 
2000). 
What then of Earth Day? And what does this mean for environmentalism 
in the 21st century? Given that Earth Day is the milestone linked with the origins 
of contemporary environmentalism (Dunlap, 1992, p. 2), opening this question up 
provides some insight into why environmentalism “died” (Nordhaus & 
Shellenberger, 2007). The common narrative casts Earth Day as the brainchild of 
the idealistic and environmentally concerned youth. In reality, Senator Gaylord 
Nelson had the idea to host a teach-in after seeing this method’s success with the 
anti-Vietnam movement (p. 30). With his power came funding for Earth Day and 
the formation of the National Resource Defense Council (p. 30). In other words, 
Earth Day’s and environmentalism’s political entry into American government 
began within the government in a way not often recognized in light of the perhaps 
more inspiring story of a spontaneous grassroots social movement.  
That said, a social movement did form during this time and it did taper off 
significantly after the landmark policy reformation of the 1970s. Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger point to how the institutions of environmentalism codified the 
traditional worldview of man’s separation from nature and are now restricted by it 
as a result (Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007). Complementary to this analysis, 
environmental sociologist Riley Dunlap evoked Mauss’s (1975) “natural decay” 
of social movements model to describe the way in which the institutionalization 
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of the environmental movement absorbed perceived social responsibility (Dunlap, 
1992, p. 3-4). Where Dunlap sees institutions as siphoning environmentalism 
from the people (in agreement with the common narrative), Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger see the common narrative described at the beginning of this section 
ignorant of its institutionalized inception.  
If we recognize institutions are effective tools and we recognize that we 
must find ways to face the environmental challenge, then institutional creativity 
holds some promise. The “break through” for Nordhaus and Shellenberger is that 
“modern environmentalism with all of its unexamined assumptions, outdated 
concepts and exhausted strategies, must die so that something new can live” 
(Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007, p. 10). This “something new” is “post 
environmentalism,” where the special interests of old environmentalism are 
analyzed, filtered, and integrated into larger societal needs such as economic 
development, health care, and social justice.  
Although their conclusion seems somewhat overstated it also seems to 
resonate with many academics and activists within the growing field of 
sustainability, which uses interdisciplinary skills to address a range of problems 
emerging from maladaptive human-environment interactions (for the history and 
organization of the sustainability movement, see Miller, 2011). Even the 
mainstream motto “go green” shows a significant shift away from 
environmentalism’s “save the earth” because people are empowered to help and 
improve their livelihoods rather than make the tradeoff at their personal expense. 
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As William Cronon argued in his plenary speech for the American Society of 
Environmental History in 2011, we are learning from our mistakes as “negative 
environmentalists” and applying our experience to make some sense of and do 
some good with the new concept of positive sustainability (Wheeler, 2011).3, 4  
Scientific authority is still invoked to justify political action when a group 
agrees on the scientific and normative framing of policy decision-making. This 
reduces the diversity of alternative policy options and marginalizes socially held 
values (Sarewitz, 2004; Bocking, 2006; Nordhaus & Shellenberger, 2007; Pielke, 
2007). One prominent group is that of academic experts because academia is seen 
as a major source of authority. 
 
Changes in Academic Science 
Institutions share "understandings and expectations of appropriate 
organizational form and behavior,” and are comprised of individual organizations, 
which are under pressure to change their methods and behavior to match the 
appropriate “institutional environment” (Tolbert, 1985, p. 1). This is the case with 
academia and universities. But what constitutes the institutional environment? 
Can its organizations or partner institutions affect it? These questions are threaded 
throughout the rest of this thesis, but for now I turn to the professionalization of 
                                                 
3
 Your author was a member of this audience.  
4
 Nordhaus and Shellenberger allude to this point. They state that post 
environmentalism must be sustainable, but stop short of calling it sustainability.  
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science in academia to see how it influenced the practice and conceptual 
foundations of science.  
Science is the “systematic pursuit of knowledge” (Pielke, 2007, p. 31). Or 
put another way, science’s “proper concern is the construction of comprehensive 
accounts of the natural world” and it does this by “testing, retesting, rejecting, and 
reformulating hypotheses” (Longino, 1990, p. 32, 34). Science is a method and 
perhaps a worldview strongly guided by epistemic virtues (Longino, 1990; 
Norton, 1991; Sarewitz, 2004; Pielke, 2007) which are “specific ways of 
investigating and picturing nature (Daston & Galison, 2007, p. 28). Of these 
virtues, objectivity is arguably the most common. Indeed, “conceptually, it 
operates by synecdoche, making this or that aspect of objectivity stand for the 
whole [of science] on an ad hoc basis” (Daston & Galison, 2007, p. 29). 
Objectivity has two components. One is its descriptive accuracy of the 
natural phenomena under scientific interrogation. The other is its freedom from 
inappropriate values held by the scientific practitioner or imposed by some aspect 
of society such as moral, economic, propriety, religious, and otherwise cultural or 
personal values known as non-epistemic values (Longino, 1990, pp. 62-63). This 
two-part definition is characteristic of the positivist’s account of what counts as 
good scientific knowledge, the production of which depends each individual 
contributing scientist having the quality of objectivity (p. 66). 
The underlying notions of purity in science are reflected in the 
development of the atomic bomb in World War II and the new science policy 
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following their uses (Stokes, 1997). President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
commissioned Vannevar Bush, the Director of the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development (OSRD), to report on how to transfer America’s wartime 
scientific progress into peacetime in 1944 (Bush, 1945). The OSRD was housed 
in the Executive Office of the President (Stokes, 1997, p. 47) and this contributed 
to the impact Bush’s report Science the Endless Frontier would grow to have 
following its publication in July of 1945. In the report Bush coined the term 
“basic science” (research performed without practical ends, in its “purest form”) 
and placed it in opposition to “applied science” (the transformation of basic 
knowledge to “complete answers” through innovation) (p. 3). He was the first to 
associate basic science with pure science and his argument for how to attain 
scientific greatness hinges on it. Bush’s argument is now known as the “linear 
model,” and through it Bush explains that scientific greatness comes from heavily 
investing in basic science that is free of any contaminating thoughts about its 
application. Such thoughts are the responsibility of technological innovators down 
the pipeline rather than research scientists. The dichotomy between basic and 
applied science was thus drawn and codified through the identity of scientists.   
The United States dropped both atomic bombs on Japan the month 
following the publishing of Science the Endless Frontier and brought the end of 
WWII into sight. The method of producing the bombs followed Bush’s linear 
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model,5 so this guided the new standard practices and philosophies of science 
institutionalized by the creation of the National Science Foundation (NSF) a few 
years later. NSF’s mission was to primarily pursue “pure research and training” 
by using publically generated funds to support science in academia and other 
research institutions (Kevles, 1987, p. 344). As Bush stated in his 1945 report,  
“These institutions are uniquely qualified by tradition and by their 
special characteristics to carry on basic research. They are charged 
with the responsibility of conserving the knowledge accumulated 
by the past, imparting that knowledge to students, and contributing 
new knowledge of all kinds. It is chiefly in these institutions that 
scientists may work in an atmosphere which is relatively free from 
the adverse pressure of convention, prejudice, or commercial 
necessity.” 
 
The practice of academic science as only basic science and training of 
objective scientists served to mutually ensure freedom from subjective and social 
non-epistemic values. This recent history supports the belief that objectivity 
defines science and in “environmental affairs, the postwar authority of science 
was epitomized by confidence that the same strategies that had won the war could 
be applied to defeating ‘enemies’ in nature” (Bocking, 2006, p. 15). 
But the history of objectivity is much longer. The oldest records of 
objectivity date back to the fourteenth century, where the Latin adjectival form 
obiective was (as now) paired with its antithesis, subiective. This oldest known 
casting defined objective reports of events as “things as they are presented to 
consciousness,” and subjective events were the actual “things in themselves” 
                                                 
5
 Einstein’s basic research in atomic energy fed into the big-budgeted 
Manhattan Project which produced the atomic bomb (Kevles, 1987). 
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(Daston & Galison, 2007, p. 29). These meanings carried on into the dictionaries 
of the eighteenth century as seen in the definition of objectivity being the 
descriptive property of a thing “when it exists [as an] Object of the Mind” (Daston 
& Galison, 2007 p. 29 citing Chambers, 1728). The reversing of meaning familiar 
today took place only in the mid nineteenth century (Daston & Galison, 2007, p. 
31). Clearly, the meaning of objectivity is subject to change. 
After objectivity and subjectivity switched meanings, objectivity became 
one of the guiding epistemic virtues6 of science along with truth-to-nature (i.e. 
descriptive accuracy) and trained judgement (i.e. the scientific use of 
methodological and mental skills) (Daston & Galison, 2007, pp. 19, 33, 39). The 
relationships between the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity, descriptive 
acccuracy and freedom from value, and scientific training changed over the 
centuries. One example is how scientific illustrators went through a transistion in 
the 1860s from seeking to display idealistically true forms of natural objects to 
embracing the messiness of details and variation found in nature (Daston & 
Galison, 2007, p. 35). Both sides believed that their method was more true to 
nature and the other side was “scandalous [by being] subjective” (p. 35). It should 
come as no surprise that these concepts central to science are continuing to 
change. As Richard Rudner concluded in reference to objectivity defining the 
postivist’s account of science (1953, p. 6), 
                                                 
6
 Epistemic virtues then are epistemic values now. They are simply 
understood are traits that define knowledge or are likley to produce knowledge if 
followed. See McMullin (1982) and Daston & Galison (2007 p. 39-42) for a more 
in depth discussion of epistemic values. 
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“The slightly juvenile conception of the coldblooded, emotionless, 
impersonal, passive scientist mirroring the world perfectly in the 
highly polished lenses of his steel rimmed glasses,—this 
stereotype—is no longer, if it ever was, adequate.” 
 
Many philosophers of science have since showed how central values are in 
science and are often collectively refered to as “post-positivist” arguments (e.g., 
McMullin, 1982; Nickel, 1989; Longino, 1990; Rolin, 1998; Machamer & 
Douglas, 2003). This began with elucidating how evaluating hypotheses and 
determining the strength of inference were epistemic value judgements, and 
expanded into discussions about cognitive, social, political, and other values in 
science. Longino (1990), like many post-positivist scholars, argues we can work 
with our values and still “our intuition that scientific inquiry at its best is objective 
is kept intact by appealing to the spirit of criticism that is its traditional hallmark” 
(p. 82).  
Such a view entails a shift away from thinking science as the discovery of 
nature’s universal truths through the toiling efforts of individuals in isolation 
(positivism) towards science as a social activity with transparent values producing 
increasingly more helpful and explanatory hypotheses and theories through the 
public interrogation of ideas, beliefs, and values (post-positivism) (Longino, 
1990, p. 66-67). Longino argues that the peer reivew system characteristic of 
science is one of the main processes that transforms scientific research into 
knowledge through structured but relatively free social interaction. Longino  
continues to argue that if scientists can articulate and then subject their values to 
constructive criticism, then values “can be defended, modified, or abandoned in 
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response” (p. 74) similar to the way the peer review system treats research. 
Sarewitz (2004) echoes this point by arguing that to dismantle the scientization of 
politics process, the open deliberation about norms and values within the 
scientific community. Without this, science is used as an ill-suited vessel for value 
based decisions. 
Given this shift in practice, objectivity becomes a concept with its degrees 
“dependent upon the depth and scope of the transformative interrogation that 
occurs in any given scientific community” (Longino, 1990, p. 79). In other words, 
being objective is a community practice, not a characteristic of individuals. But 
“most scientists… are simply unaware of the understandings of the scholarly 
community who study science in society” (Pielke, 2007, p. 8). By Longino’s 
argument and Pielke’s claim, the more ignorant the scientific community is of the 
critiques of science, the less objective they are and apparently this is the current 
state.  
This review of environmentalism and academic science in America sheds 
light on why environmental scientists employed by academia publically take a 
guarded approach to environmentalism due to its inherent normativity but are less 
wary of research based sustainability. They are unsure how to transition towards a 
socially relevant science because the history of positivist objectivity has is 
integral to the employment of scientists in academia and the funding of their basic 
science through NSF. Furthermore, questions of socially relevant science raise 
concerns about policy advocacy. As mentioned in chapter one, these debates 
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illustrate how scientists understand objectivity differently and consequently 
understand advocacy and the role of science in society differently. 
 
Two Policy Advocacy Debates  
The two environmental science advocacy debates I chose to analyze in the 
AES literature appeared in the journals Conservation Biology in 2007, and in 
Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment in 2008–2010. They illustrate how 
changes in the practices and conceptual foundations of environmentalism and 
academic science are starting to influence AES. 
Conservation biology as a scientific discipline struggles with its stance 
toward policy advocacy. This tension is not new; on the contrary, the debate over 
advocacy by biodiversity scientists took root well before the field emerged and 
the Society of Conservation Biology (SCB) formed in the mid-1980s (Soulé, 
1985, Meine, Soulé, & Noss, 2006).7 With this in mind, SCB decided to hold a 
symposium in the 2006 annual meeting on the topic of policy advocacy. The five 
papers presented at the symposium were published in a special edition of its 
journal Conservation Biology in 2007 (Lackey, 2007; Noss, 2007; Brussard & 
Tull, 2007; Murphy & Noon, 2007; Scott, et al., 2007). Together, these papers 
provide a revealing glimpse into conservation biologists’ views about the role of 
                                                 
7
 Various scientific, social, institutional, and political factors came 
together in new ways in the 20th century to move scientists to advance a broader 
conservation agenda for society (Callicott, 1990; Minteer & Manning, 2003; 
Meine, Soulé, & Noss, 2006). 
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advocacy in their science, as well as their understanding of the various possible 
modes of policy advocacy by conservation scientists. 
The authors of all five papers agree that environmental scientists are “in 
the best position to interpret [the] facts [they generated]” (Noss, 2007, p. 19). 
Additionally, they all agree that scientists should use this knowledge to inform 
policy. J. Michael Scott and his colleagues surveyed the SCB membership at the 
SCB meeting in 2006 about the prevalence and promotion of policy advocacy in 
Conservation Biology. They found 89 percent8 of the survey respondents knew of 
such prevalence and 72 percent thought the journal should continue to publish 
papers with this type of language. Hiding within this consensus of SCB 
membership, however, is disagreement about what advocacy actually is. This 
disagreement forms the core of the policy advocacy debate in the field. 
Robert Lackey defines policy advocacy as the “support of a particular 
policy or class of policies” and values as “a core belief that tends to determine or 
shape personal or group policy preferences,” to argue that advocacy is 
inappropriate for scientists (Lackey, 2007, p. 13). Lackey “subscribe[s] to the 
view that science is not free of values” (p. 13). Despite apparently understanding 
science from a post-positivist point of view, he still believes that the proper role 
of the scientist when informing policy is to provide “objective… accurate, 
relevant, and policy-neutral information” (p. 12). Furthermore, this marks the line 
between normal and normative (i.e. value-laden) science, the latter of which 
                                                 
8
 I note that the paper reports “more than 70%” yet the data results add up 
to 89.4% (Scott, et al., 2007, p. 32).  
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engages in “stealth policy advocacy” due to its implicit or explicit policy 
preferences as seen in language like “degradation, good, and healthy” (p. 13, 14).  
Scientists acting as policy advocates—stealth or otherwise—run the risk 
of harming their credibility and the credibility of the scientific community 
according to Lackey (2007) and Scott, et al (2007). Dennis Murphy and Barry 
Noon’s paper echoes Lackey’s positions that scientists must provide neutral 
information when participating in decision-making to maintain credibility and 
increase the impact of science on policy and management decision-making 
(Murphy & Noon, 2007).  
Reed Noss takes a contrasting position. He sees no contradiction between 
a conservation biologist being an advocate for biodiversity (and other normative 
issues) while retaining objectivity (Noss, 2007). Like Lackey, he acknowledges 
that values are in science, but he carries this further. Noss maintains that how 
scientists select research, interpret results, and decide what to advocate for are all 
value-laden choices. This leads to an alternative form of objectivity Longino 
(1990) argues for, where the “collective, social process of science” is reflected 
(Noss, p. 19). Included in this social process is discussing “scientific and 
philosophical ideas with your colleagues and students in the classroom” (p. 19).9 
 Peter Brussard and John Tull introduce four types of advocacy they 
believe conservation biologists, particularly academics, ought to engage in: 
professional advocacy, advocacy for science, advocacy for ecosystem services, 
                                                 
9
 This last point will be opened up using respondent data in chapter four. 
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and advocacy for the natural world (Brussard & Tull, 2007, p. 21-23). 
Professional advocacy informs policy decision-makers and managers—in addition 
to the public—of the science with their expertise when issues develop. Essential 
to this is being explicitly transparent about what is known, what is thought as 
known, and what is opinion. But the education and experience of the policy 
decision-maker(s) the scientist is trying to inform limits even the most earnest 
professional advocate. Brussard and Tull argue academics have a special 
responsibility to incorporate advocacy for science into their roles as educators (p. 
22). By educating students, Brussard and Tull hope to enhance the abilities of 
future policy-decisions makers and the general public to better inform their 
choices. 
Brussard and Tull (2007) continue by discussing how advocacy for 
ecosystem services and for the natural world reinforces this point. They believe 
this helps put citizens in touch with their environing conditions, because “without 
a first-hand familiarity with nature the conservation ethic wanes” (p. 22, 23). 
Advocating for science through education and advocating for people to have 
direct contact with their ecosystem services and the natural world work together. 
These three forms of advocacy contribute to the effectiveness of professional 
advocacy by increasing the odds that policy decision-makers and stakeholders are 
working with a similar foundation of values and understanding of the 
environment.  
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The positions taken in this debate indicate that the authority of science is 
at least uncommon. Through this assumed axiom comes the desire to have works 
against the grain towards widespread agreement on shunning advocacy (Lackey, 
2007; Scott, et al., 2007), the definition of objectivity (Noss, 2007), and society’s 
evaluation of nature (Brussard & Tull, 2007). 
The Ecological Society of America (ESA) also has a history of policy 
advocacy and continues to struggle with finding and following guidelines for this 
activity (Janzen, 1986; Tjossem, 1994; Bazzaz, et al., 1998; Kinchy, 2006; Chew, 
2009). Indeed, current disagreements over advocacy divide environmental 
scientists just as they did a hundred years ago during the early formation of ESA 
in 1915.10 Today, however, ecologists have more scholarly venues in which to 
disseminate their views on advocacy and related questions of science and society.  
For example, the ESA started publishing Frontiers in Ecology and the 
Environment in 2003 to go “beyond the recognized boundaries of a traditional 
scientific journal” (Lymn & Silver, 2010). According to ESA’s Director of Public 
Affairs11 Nadine Lymn and Frontiers’ Editor-in-Chief Sue Silver12, the journal 
                                                 
10
 Victor Shelford was one of the founding members of ESA and became 
the de facto chairman of the Committee on the Preservation of Natural Conditions 
in 1917. (Tjossem, 1994; Kinchy, 2006; Chew, 2009). From 1917 to 1945, the 
committee actively used the scientific value of basic research to tactfully advocate 
for policies. WWII increased tensions about advocacy in ESA and Shelford was 
bureaucratically stripped of his power before he resigned. Shelford went on to 
help form the Nature Conservancy in 1950. 
11
 This is the case of the writing in July, 2012. (http://www.esa.org/pao/) 
12
 This is the case of this writing in July, 2012. 
(http://www.esa.org/aboutesa/staffDirectory.php) 
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did this by providing the publication space for ecologists to discuss the 
implications of their scientific research for policy makers and resource managers 
(Silver, 2003).  
Frontiers is criticized simultaneously for going too far and not going far 
enough with their mission.  This tension is on display in what I’ll refer to as the 
Don Strong13 debates of 2008–2010 (Strong, 2008a; de la Rosa, 2008; Strong, 
2008b; Burke & Lauenroth, 2009; Strong, 2009; Lymn & Silver, 2010; Meyer, 
Frumboff, Hamburg, & de la Rosa, 2010). Examination of these debates shows 
how controversial the advocacy question remains among ecologists nearly a 
century after the formation of the ESA. 
At the ESA Annual Meeting in 2008, audience members “were told by a 
prominent ecologist that we are scientists and therefore should eschew 
environmentalism” (Strong, 2008a, p. 347). In the audience sat ecologist (and 
editor of the ESA journal, Ecology) Don Strong and he channeled his surprise and 
frustration regarding this eschewing position into a 2008 Frontiers editorial. 
Strong argued in favor of ecologists’ embracing environmentalism because 
“[ecologists] use science to study the environment, and science provides the 
rationale and avenue for its preservation” (p. 347). Additionally, Strong argued, 
“To separate ecological science from environmentalism to avoid potential 
negative connotations of the latter affords anti-environmentalists the power of 
                                                 
13
 Don Strong became Editor-in-Chief January 1, 2001 (Ecology’s New 
Leadership, 2001) and is still in this position of this writing in July, 2012. 
(http://www.esapubs.org/esapubs/editors_E.htm) 
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demagoguery; with rhetoric and false claims, they will have achieved prejudice 
against the subject of our studies” (p. 347). He concluded that “It should be a 
tenet of our ethics as ecologists to reject and counter the defamation of 
environmentalism” (p. 347). 
Carlos de la Rosa replied to Strong’s argument by writing that if ecologists 
are environmentalists, they run the risk of acquiring the “interest group” label and 
become an advocacy group (de la Rosa, 2008). For de la Rosa, if scientists lose 
their special authority, then the already weak channels of communication between 
ecologists and decision-makers would be further damaged. Ecologists Indy Burke 
and Bill Lauenroth follow a similar line in their response to Strong’s editorial. 
They argued that they believe ecologists ought not be environmentalists because 
“individuals and groups allowing their values to creep into their analysis of 
environmental problems” are by definition not scientifically objective (Burke & 
Lauenroth, 2009, p. 240). The result is a loss in the credibility for the ecological 
science community and that could cause decision-makers and policy specialists to 
purposefully make uninformed decisions because the ecological science is 
illegitimate.14 But Burke and Lauenroth contend at the end of their reply “few 
ESA members… are not environmentalists at heart” (p. 240). 
                                                 
14
 Lauenroth (2003) argues in agreement with this point in the first volume 
of Frontiers published. He believes if ecologists become advocates they will 
become environmental activists, and the mission of activism—“to preserve some 
aspect of the earth”—does not commensurate with the goal of science—to 
generate knowledge (p. 48). 
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Strong argues that ecologists (as environmentalists) are advocates, but 
their advocacy is guided by the commitment to “objectivity, rationality, and well-
supported evidence” (Strong, 2008b, p. 468). Objectivity does not rule out all 
values unless one takes a “strictly negative connotation and narrow definition of 
values” (Strong, 2009, p. 240). Strong discusses the many positive values of 
science—e.g. “objectivity” and “rigorous empiricism”—and positive values 
outside of basic science that environmental science labors to understand—e.g. 
“utilitairian,... intrinsic,... and opportunity values.” Furthermore, he argues that 
reflecting on the ways epistemic and social values function in science can actually 
make science more thorough and more applicable to environmental decision-
making to help achieve, the goal of ecology as publicly useful science. In sum, 
Strong believes that it is not the case that ecologists working as environmentalists 
lowers the scientific bar of ecology (as de la Rosa, and Burke and Lauenroth 
argue); rather, they raise the bar of environmentalism by placing it on solid 
scientific supports (as Strong argues). 
“Scientists can be objective and effective advocates, without this being a 
contradiction in terms” (Meyer, Frumboff, Hamburg, & de la Rosa, 2010, p. 299). 
It is worth the risk of sounding redundant to point out that de la Rosa, i.e. one of 
the previous authors who disagreed with Strong (2008a), published this view. 
This shows a considerable change in his understanding of how values, objectivity, 
credibility, authority, and advocacy relate in the environmental sciences.15 
                                                 
15
 He and his coauthors even cited Noss (2007) for this view. 
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Seemingly key to de la Rosa’s 2010 position of “science-based advocacy” is the 
rule of “Transparently represent the scientific basis for policy recommendations 
and explicitly acknowledge the values that also inform them” (p. 301, emphasis 
added). They conclude that “Academic environmental scientists could play a 
more substantial role in developing sound environmental policies if the criteria for 
success in academic institutions... recognized the challenges in making science 
relevant to policy” (p. 305).  
Analyzing these two environmental science policy advocacy debates 
shows there is a sense that these scientist re making appeals to a group beyond 
conservation biologists and ecologists to “academic environmental scientists” 
(Meyer, et al, 2010, p. 305). This emerging AES community does acknowledge 
that environmental values do play roles in their decisions, but rather than 
addressing what exactly those roles are, the concepts of objectivity, credibility, 
and authority are often used as ambiguous proxies. Where Lacky (2007) and 
Burke and Lauenroth (2009) primarily appeal to objectivity to prevent a 
transparent investigation of how non-epistemic values function in science, Strong 
(2008a, 2008b, 2009) and Noss (2007) work with a different definition of 
objectivity to promote such an investigation. Yet, ironically everyone agrees good 
science is objective science despite defining objectivity differently. Additionally, 
these scientists agree that environmental policy informed by environmental 
science is better than the alternative (i.e. policy not informed by science) and an 
apparent consensus is developing that AES are responsible for ensuring this 
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benefit. These two cases illustrate how semantically complex and frequently 
gridlocked the nature of policy advocacy debates are in the AES community.  
 
An Emerging Value Framework 
The meaning of value has a rich and complex history.16 As I explained in 
the introduction, this thesis takes a more pragmatic approach of working to 
understand how AES use values to make decisions, with special attention paid 
towards environmental values. My approach, in other words, is more sociological 
and functional in nature rather than being a conceptual or philosophical analysis 
of the content and structure of alternative environmental values. 
This section explores one proposed framework of environmental values 
and a framework for understanding the values of communities, which I define as 
any collection of people organized around a common goal with centralized 
interaction to build and enforce a common culture (synthesized from Morris, 1963 
& Longino, 1990). This means environmentalists and academic scientists can be 
treated as belonging to an environmental community and an academic science 
community, but this community may not be a cohesive entity, or always 
                                                 
16
 Briefly, Aristotle wrote the bedrock of value theory, particularly in 
Nicomachean Ethics where questions of what is good for man, what is virtue, and 
what is intrinsic value opened up (Aristotle, 335-323BC/1889). The influential 
reach of his answers carries through the metaethical works of Immanuel Kant 
(Kant, 1785/1997), the utilitarian codes of John Stuart Mill (Mill, 1907), John 
Rawls’ system of justice (Rawls, 1971), G.E. Moore’s axiology (Moore, 1993), 
and its impact is still recognized in abstract (Justus, et al., 2009a; Sagoff, 2009; 
Justus, et al., 2009b) and more practical philosophical debates (Daily, 1997; 
McCauley, 2006) about how society ought to value the environment. 
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recognizable. I synthesize these frameworks into a larger value mapping 
framework for understanding how environmental values interact with other values 
in within and between members of the seemingly emerging AES community. 
To begin, I use the follow definition of value: “the motivational factor for 
an individual or a group’s behavior, overt or mental” (Najder, 1975, p. 67). From 
this perspective, values are understood as embedded convictions at the junctures 
of thought where decisions are made. In addition, I borrow the definition of 
environmental values provided by one of my interview respondents: 
"Environmental values are our beliefs about how nature benefits 
us, and what that means in return for our responsibilities towards 
nature." 
 
 This is, of course, one respondent’s definition, but it is a fairly 
representative understanding of environmental value as expressed by the scientists 
I interviewed for this study.  
 Along with these ideas, another influential classification system can be 
used to make sense of environmental values: the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment’s (MA) ecosystem services categories (MA, 2003). Ecosystem 
services are defined as “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems,” and there 
are four categories that provide the environing conditions for the well being of 
people (see table 2-1). 
 
 
 
   29 
Table 2-1 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment’s Ecosystem Services 
Cultural services  are the nonmaterial benefits of ecosystems, such as 
recreational, educational, inspirational, 
spiritual, religious, and aesthetic 
Provisional services  are the material goods produced or provided by 
ecosystems, such as food, water, shelter, and 
genetic resources 
Regulating services are the benefits obtained from the regulation of 
ecosystem services processes, such as 
climate, flood, and disease 
Supportive services  are necessary for the production of the above 
described ecosystem services, such as soil 
formation, primary production, and nutrient 
cycling 
 
The MA conceptual framework was “established to help provide the 
knowledge base for improved decisions and to build capacity for analyzing and 
supplying [the] information" (MA, 2003, p. 27). With this knowledge foundation 
"[s]ound policy and management interventions" can be made for "[h]uman well-
being and progress toward sustainable development" (p. 27). The MA framework 
does this by situating supportive services beneath provisioning, regulating, and 
cultural services, which then link to individuals and societies as a whole through 
use (instrumental value) or supplement human decisions by existing with values 
independent of human use (intrinsic value) (p. 34).  
To give an example, the supportive ecosystem service of primary 
production of trees provision fuel and shelter materials, regulate water purity and 
floods, and are culturally significant for recreational and education use 
(instrumental values) in addition to being places with aesthetics and spirituality 
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(intrinsic values).17 Fuel and clean water are fundamental to a good and healthy 
life as are shelter from and mitigation of natural disasters such as floods. The 
three categories of security, good life basics, and health are predominately 
supported by provisioning and regulating ecosystem services, but social relations 
are entirely supported by cultural ecosystem services (ibid, p. 28). In the example 
provided, cultural services included recreation and education as instrumental 
values whereas the aesthetics and spirituality values can be inherent to the place 
itself as intrinsic values. Although the intrinsic value of nature plays a historic and 
consistently central role in conservation biology (e.g., Soulé, 1985; Noss, 2007), 
my analysis here focuses on the largely instrumentalist categories of value 
provided by the MA, which is familiar to the scientists I interviewed and is also a 
framework that has considerable currency in the policy and management 
community.  
Combining the aforementioned definitions of value and environmental 
value transforms the MA conceptual framework of ecosystem services into an 
evaluative framework of environmental values. By this I mean the MA ecosystem 
services categories are populated by environmental values and statements about 
them can be evaluated for the motivational content of individuals’ and/or 
groups’—academic environmental scientists in this thesis—overt or mental 
                                                 
17
 I recognized that some argue aesthetics are instrumental environmental 
values (Justus, Colyvan, Regan, & Maguire, 2009). This example is worked with 
the primary guidance of MA (2005). 
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behaviors—such as devoting their life to studying the environment or choosing 
how to associate with environmental policy.  
 With a framework of environmental values asserted, I turn to the second 
framework for how values (of which environmental values are a subset) function 
in the decisions of AES. For this process I return to Longino’s arguments in 
Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (1990). 
Longino’s work is valuable for this project given that she specifically writes that 
sociologists can develop her framework to make visible the “institutional features 
of the practice of science that affects its content” (p. 64). Longino’s work also 
informed similar studies of environmental values, advocacy, and scientific 
objectivity among environmental scientists, including a sociological study of 
ecologists (Wallington & Moore, 2005) and a more philosophical consideration of 
advocacy and credibility in conservation biology (Odenbaugh, 2003). 
As touched on earlier in this chapter philosophers, historians, and 
sociologists of science largely dismantled the traditional positivist account of 
science in favor of post-positivism. This transition allows for scientific objectivity 
to be saved if it transforms with post-positivist science (Longino, 1990; Shrader-
Frechette, 1996). Longino’s reconstruction of objectivity is no longer 
incompatible with non-epistemic values in science due to the degree of objectivity 
being a function of how involved the community members are in interrogating the 
values held by individuals and by the community. Parallel to her distinction 
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between the individual and social practice of science, Longino draws a distinction 
between contextual and constitutive value categories. 
 
Table 2-2 Longino’s Community Value Categories 
Contextual values  “the personal, social, and cultural values, those group or 
individual preferences about what ought to be, 
[and they] indicate that they belong to the social 
and cultural environment in which science is 
done” (p. 4) 
Constitutive values  “the values generated from an understanding of the 
goals of science [and they] indicate that they are 
the source of the rules determining what 
constitutes acceptable scientific practice or 
scientific method” (p. 4)18 
 
I believe Longino’s definition of constitutive values has a greater 
explanatory role in society than she grants. By that I mean if a community is 
working towards a goal and they develop rules and methods for what counts as 
acceptable actions to ensure members well reflect the community, then this 
community has constitutive values even if it is not strictly a scientific community. 
I’ll return to this point briefly, but first I will explain how contextual and 
constitutive values interact.  
Contextual values sometimes transform into constitutive values. Epistemic 
values illustrate this case well. Features that make hypotheses and theories 
desirable, such as testability, predictive accuracy, and reproducibility of results, 
are epistemic values in that they promote the legitimate production of knowledge 
                                                 
18
 Longino specifies that she takes a historically descriptive approach as 
compared to an idealistically descriptive approach. 
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(Longino, 1990). Adherence to epistemic values through unbiased and rational 
behavior (contextual value) is thought to promote the generation of truth-like 
scientific knowledge (constitutive value) in the scientific community.19  
Additionally, contextual values may be encoded in how constitutive values 
are understood to create a reinforcing feedback of values within the community 
(Longino, 1990). By accepting this and the broader definition of a community, the 
methods and goals of environmentalists and academic scientists are better 
understood. First, academic scientists hold objectivity as an epistemic value and 
therefore it is a necessary contextual value for the constitutive goal of generating 
science to help accurately describe reality. Secondly, advocacy for 
environmentalists is the method and therefore the contextual value for their 
constitutive goal of environmental policy and worldview change.  
The emerging AES community can be seen as a blending of two 
communities with these two sets of contextual and constitutive values. This 
explains how a significant amount of academic environmental scientists in the 
policy advocacy debates discussed earlier contextually care about nature, the 
environment, and/or biodiversity (e.g., Noss, 2007; Brussard & Tull, 2007; Strong 
2009; even Burke & Lauenroth 2009) and how all participants constitutively 
value that AES ought to generate science helpful for informing environmental 
policy decision-making.   
                                                 
19
 But, we do not have an account to distinguish the legitimate from the 
illegitimate of contextual influence (Rolin, 1998). 
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As I will show with my data in chapter four, some of my respondents 
shared how they have cultural environmental values as contextual values and all 
of my respondents expressed wanting to use epistemic values as contextual 
values. Furthermore, most of my respondents wanted to apply their research, often 
through policy engagement and teaching, to contribute to the continuance of 
ecological-evolutionary systems. These supporting, provisional, and regulatory 
environmental values are the constitutive values for the AES interviewed. 
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Chapter 3 
METHODOLOGY 
This thesis investigates the roles environmental values play in the 
decisions of a sample of academic environmental scientists (AES). As discussed 
earlier, I decided to take a sociological approach to understand how AES 
perceive, treat, and use their values (of which environmental values are one type) 
when reflecting on the decisions they made to become and remain a practicing 
environmental scientist employed by the academy.  
Although my interdisciplinary training in conservation biology, 
philosophy, and ethics helped me select my research project, it did not provide me 
with all of the skills to necessary to conduct the more empirical aspects of the 
study. I therefore had to learn how to conduct sociological research by actually 
doing it, drawing from experience and revising my approach and methods as my 
project moved forward. I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
nineteen AES and I describe those methods in this chapter.  
 
Grounded Theory and Semi-Structured Interviews 
I followed the tradition of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Charmaz, 2006) to design, conduct, and analyze a qualitative sociological study of 
nineteen scientists from four public universities.20  Grounded theory’s sampling 
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 Arizona State University’s Institutional Review Board granted my 
research exemption status. See Appendix A for documentation. All rules of 
contact were followed. 
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method is not aimed at representing a population; rather, it samples individuals to 
discover some of the relationships in use within a group of people (Charmaz, 
2006, p. 6). This approach is not about forming and testing hypotheses. Through 
the use of the “constant comparison method,” I simultaneously collect and 
analyze my data to root the conceptual growth in my protocol changes and in the 
decisions made to select the next round of respondents (p. 5). Additionally, to 
help reduce researcher bias, grounded theory calls for conducting the literature 
review after developing the analysis.  
I began by identifying potential respondents in the fields of conservation 
biology and ecology, but then decided to expand my selection criteria to include 
environmental and certain types of civil engineers as I learned more about the 
history of basic and applied science. Additionally, I decided that diversity 
between and within fields would expose me to a finer degree of contrast in 
accordance with the constant comparison method of grounded theory. Interview 
times ranged from thirty minutes to one hundred and forty minutes, with an 
approximate average of sixty minutes.  
The discovery-based approach of grounded theory aims to uncover bases 
of comparison to find contrasting positions. Abduction (i.e. inference to the best 
explanation) is used to systematically identify variations of beliefs, actions, and 
their relations. To do this, the researcher interviews contrasting respondents in 
round punctuated with data analysis to more finely tune the differences with 
successive rounds of interviews. The found patterns drive the direction of the 
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research itself. This provides the foundation out of which theories are constantly 
developed and redeveloped. The result is the discovery of new empirically 
grounded relationships. 
A tripartite relationship is used to structure the data into dimensions, 
attributes, and values (a.k.a. categories, characteristics, and values) (Gerson, 
1998). To illustrate, people have hands that have in total ten fingers. The 
dimension of people having hands has the characteristic of fingers and the value 
of ten. Some people don’t have ten fingers (variation of value), some people don’t 
have hands (variation of attribute), and there are creatures that aren’t people 
(variation of dimension).21 We often assume things are a certain way and only 
after being exposed to variation can we appreciate diversity. Additionally, by 
exploring the interactions within and in between dimensions, attributes, and 
values, data is analyzed with managed depth.  
Four dimensions (categories) developed during my research process. 
These are not mutually exclusive dimensions; they are centralized, interwoven, 
and mutually reinforcing. The first dimension, Motivations for Being an 
Academic Environmental Scientist, explores some of the decisions made for 
becoming an AES and how certain values influence scientists’ decision to remain 
in this career track. The second dimension, Conditions of Academic Conditioning, 
focuses on academia as the institution connecting generations of AES through 
scientific training and practice. In the third dimension, Objectivity, Credibility, 
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 I thank Elihu Gerson for providing this example.  
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and Authority, the different meanings of these three concepts and their 
interrelationships are explored. The fourth and final dimension, Engaging Policy, 
covers the variety of ways respondents understand where and why the line is 
drawn between appropriate and inappropriate policy engagement behaviors.  
I will explain below which types of questions prompted answers that 
created and fell into the four dimensions.  Yet, questions also varied due to the 
open-ended, semi-structured nature of administering grounded theory-based 
interviews.  I also tried to press respondents for justifications when they used 
normative language answering questions, so the questions varied somewhat 
depending upon the answers given and the flow of discussion in a particular 
interview. 
 
Motivations for Being an Academic Environmental Scientist 
The questions for this dimension were mostly asked in the early part of the 
interview to help prepare the respondent for introspection and also give me some 
personal background to use throughout the rest of the interview. Respondents 
shared personal experiences from their childhoods, their reasons for choosing 
their field(s) of study, and their stories for how they became and why they remain 
an academic.  
Questions on this subject began as “Were there any formative experiences 
that helped lead you into your profession?” and “What motivated you to invest 
your time and energy into your studies?” and evolved over the course of the study 
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to questions such as “Hypothetically, if there were no limits on time, money or 
who you could talk to, what would you do with the rest of your life?”, “What 
value do you see in your research?” and “What impact do you want your research 
to have?”  
 
Conditions of Academic Conditioning 
At the outset, I only considered the role of academia as an employer but I 
quickly expanded this after I realized the diversity of career paths in the 
environmental sciences. Respondents shared their views on how academia trained 
and now employs them to train the generation of scientists. Conversations often 
expanded to reflections on what they can and cannot do as an academic, such as 
mentoring students, and how time constraints to faculty evaluations limits them 
from engaging policy. Comparisons between academia and other institutions, e.g. 
federal agencies, provided additional contrast for why they chose academia.  
Every interview contained the question, “What tradeoffs did you consider 
when deciding to join academia?” but grew to include, “Do you think academic 
environmental scientists should be promoted or restricted from communicating 
their findings to policy decision-makers?” and “Do you ever hear your colleagues 
talk about why they do the work they do?”  These alternative phrasings provided a 
way to address the same content from a different direction.  
It appeared that many of my interview respondents were not used to 
providing deeper normative or personal justifications for their scientific work – 
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e.g., the response “that’s how I was trained,” was quite common among the 
scientists I spoke with. I therefore decided to focus this line of questioning on 
professionalized habits of tradition, e.g. a single disciplinary approach or 
conducting basic research, and opportunistically asked my respondents about their 
training. There did not seem to be an appropriate way to create a question for this, 
as academic training was used as a reason for not having a personal justification.  
 
Objectivity, Authority, and Credibility 
The questions for this dimension changed the most as my interviews 
progressed. I believe this was in part due to my growing appreciation of the depth 
of these concepts, and in part to how they articulated with some larger themes in 
the philosophy of science as well as the specific debates over values and advocacy 
some AES are engaged in. Respondents did vary on the meaning of objectivity, 
yet did not seem to vary as much on its perceived importance in science. This was 
appeared important for how they understand the relationships between objectivity, 
credibility, and authority. 
 Questions on these interrelated topics included, “How do you understand 
objectivity?”, “What do you think about the developing argument that science 
cannot be objective because values are inescapable in science?”, “Do you think 
your held environmental values have ever positively or negatively impacted your 
credibility as a scientist?” [if the respondent acknowledged environmental 
values], “What differences and/or similarities do you see when comparing 
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ecologists and conservation biologists in relation to objectivity?”, “Do you think 
you think that environmental values have influenced important decisions in your 
career?”, and “Do you think the limits of science are changing? Should they?”  
 
Engaging Policy 
The direct form of these questions came at the end of the interview due to 
the controversial and complex nature of the policy advocacy. I decided to 
structure the protocol this way so I could better understand the respondent’s views 
that contribute to their understanding of policy advocacy in addition giving them 
the opportunity to trust me. Respondents often shared their positions before 
getting to the explicit questions in the protocol, which suggests that the advocacy 
debate concepts are interrelated in many respondents’ thinking of their science, 
their institutional affiliations, and understandings of philosophy of science. 
Questions ranged from “How do you draw the line between appropriate 
and inappropriate ways for environmental scientists to engage in environmental 
policy decision-making?”, to “What do you think about how professional 
societies are handling discussions about environmental policy advocacy?” and “If 
policy decision-makers were to use your research, do you think it would have a 
positive impact?”  
 
Every interview was different not only because of the questions asked and 
the personalities of the respondents—some were talkative, some were more 
   42 
reserved or even defensive22—but because my approach developed as I went 
through the interview process. I initially wanted to document what environmental 
values are held by members of the AES community but realized a more effective 
approach is to understand how these scientists understand and use environmental 
values within the larger context of their careers. This lead to my respondents 
explaining their motivations for choosing their career in academia and their 
motivations for what they want to do with their career through direct, indirect, or 
merely suggestive environmental values contributing to this decision process.  
                                                 
22
 This is not surprising. As Longino states, “scientists sometimes become 
defensive when asked to comment on the relation between science and values 
because the think their moral integrity is being challenged” (1990, p. 5) 
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Chapter 4 
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 
Introduction to Respondents and Results 
 
 This chapter presents and discusses a set of patterns found in the interview 
data gathered. As explained in chapter three, grounded theory provided the 
methodology for structuring this exploratory qualitative sociological research. 
Each of the following sections focuses on one out of the four dimensions but 
notes are made when one dimension’s results connect to another. All conclusions 
drawn from respondent testimony are contingent on my ability to accurately 
interpret their words.  
There are times when I will provide an exchange between the respondent 
[R] and myself [C]. Otherwise, I’ll embed short quotes and provide block quotes 
throughout this chapter. All quotations are direct transcriptions save the few 
exceptions where I add words to clarify the quote, or replace words to ensure the 
identity of the speaker cannot be deduced. Additionally, all italicized words 
reflect the respondent’s tone and bolded words are used when dealing with longer 
quotes to help highlight the ideas I analyze.  
This chapter is organized around the four dimensions discussed in chapter 
three. The first dimension, Motivations for Being an Academic Environmental 
Scientist explores some of the decisions made for becoming and remaining a 
AES. Conditions of Academic Conditioning looks at the effects of academia as an 
institution connecting generations of these scientists through scientific training 
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and practice with a notable degree of insulation. The third dimension, Objectivity, 
Credibility, and Authority, opens up the different usages of these terms and their 
relationships. The last dimension is Engaging Policy and it considers a variety of 
ways these scientists understand where the line is drawn between appropriate and 
inappropriate policy engagement behaviors. I will describe and discuss the 
patterns found within each dimensions below.  
 I interviewed respondents from four public universities in the 
Southwestern United States. The nineteen scientists interviewed all agreed to 
varying degrees that they are members of the AES community by virtue of being 
employed by the academy to practice environmental science. (Indeed, a few 
potential respondents chose to not participate because they did not believe they 
were “environmental” scientists.) In order to better understand what an 
environmental scientist in academia is I began all except the first interview by 
asking the respondent to describe how they identify themselves as a scientific 
researcher. The diversity of these answers (see Table 4-1) does more than display 
the range of respondents interviewed; it introduces the diverse ways my 
respondents conceptualize their approach to their careers and helps lay the 
foundation for the rest of this chapter.  
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Table 4-1 Respondents’ Self-Description  
Number Respondent’s self-description of identity as a scientist 
1 Bioeconomist or natural resource economist. Avoids “ecological 
economist” due to its “unfortunate history.” 
2 Generalist, behavioral ecologist, “but at the root of all of it,” a 
conservation biologist 
3 Evolutionary ecologist 
4 Environmental economist 
5 Studies coupled social-ecological systems. Currently studies 
ecosystem services, but changes fields regularly. 
6 Ecosystem ecologist and an environmental educator 
7 Industrial ecologist, sustainability engineer, emerging technology 
ethicist 
8 Trained as stream ecologist, says aquatic ecologist to most people, 
but finds these terms increasingly inaccurate. More of an 
ecological educator.  
9 Environmental justice scholar  
10 Plant ecologist  
11 Evolutionary biologist, with a specialization in conservation 
genetics  
12 Civil and environmental engineer 
13 Ecosystem ecologist turned systems scientist 
14 Ecosystem ecologist 
15 Ecologist. Trained as an ecologist and does grassland ecology 
specifically, but believes “work is relevant to ecology in general.” 
16 Biogeochemist when talking with members of the scientific 
community. Climate scientist “when talking with more lay 
audience.”  
17 Botanist “for the most general audiences.” But a geographer, 
landscape ecologist, environmental scientist for other audiences.  
18 Computational social scientist, but “for the lay person [they] 
typical say [they] study the relationships between people and the 
environment.”  
19 Climate adaptation scientist 
 
Many respondents appealed to their training in providing their self-
descriptions as environmental scientists, but interesting differences emerged 
regarding how they each related to their disciplinary training. For example, a few 
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respondents flatly answered that they were trained with a certain set of skills and 
they are therefore a certain type of scientist. Their interests fit their training in 
such a way that it gives them the primary framework through which they structure 
their career. Their identity doesn’t change; instead, their research does.  
For example: 
[R] “Well, I’m an evolutionary biologist.” 
[C] “Just straight forward?” 
[R] “Yeah, that’s my training. I was trained as evolutionary biologist and I use 
fish as a model organism. Maybe the historical context—I’ve been doing this 
since before there really was a lot of conservation biology. Being ‘old school,’23 I 
basically have approached it that conservation biology should be approached by 
getting the best biological information as possible to better inform management 
decisions. So my original training is in terms of evolutionary biology, 
population genetics, and population biology.” 
[C] “And now a good amount of your work is with isolated population genetics 
management, and online you describe your work as conservation genetics.” 
[R] “That’s where my research program has evolved to because of where we 
live…. When I moved to the Southwest, I became a conservation biologist. 
Anyone working on native fishes in the Southwestern US is a conservation 
biologist. You have to be…. a conservation geneticist is by definition an 
evolutionary geneticist…. I did not actively search out a conservation biology 
research program; I evolved into it. And I think that’s true of a lot of people of my 
age.” 
 
 For the respondent quoted above, training in a certain field did not dictate 
their research program entirely. The context of working in the Southwest 
transformed their research program into applied conservation. Another respondent 
took a completely different approach to their identity in relation to their 
disciplinary training: 
                                                 
23
 Received PhD in 1984. 
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[C] “You were trained as a civil and environmental engineer. I would like to 
know if you think that still accurately describes who you are a researcher.” 
[R] “Sure, I define what civil and environmental is; it doesn’t define me. So, 
sure, it describes me because I self identify as a civil and environmental 
engineer.” 
[C] “That’s interesting because there’s this notion that the way people are trained 
can constrict how they see themselves going through their careers.” 
[R] “Yeah, that may be true, but I’m a PhD. My job is to redefine things, create 
new knowledge. I mean, it may be true at other levels, but I have the liberty of 
being more thoughtful than that. And I have tenure. I’m supposed to decide what 
civil and environmental engineering is so I can train people to do it. I don’t 
get trained and then locked into some sort of status quo.” 
 
The two respondents quoted above treat their disciplinary training-identity 
relationship differently, perhaps because the evolutionary biologist spoke from the 
perspective of career researcher, where the civil and environmental engineer 
approached the relationship from the perspective of career educator. All 
respondents play both roles of researcher and educator and this is opened up more 
in Conditions of Academic Conditioning. Another respondent commented that, 
“There’s an unfortunate component of this career track that 
tends to make it more about your ego than it should be… maybe 
because it’s so competitive. I have this constant battle with myself. 
It’s not about you, it’s not about your ego. It’s about producing 
something that’s of value that other people can use.” 
 
It appears common for core differences and even tensions to develop due 
to the dual nature of academic employment, career, and identity.  
Respondents identified themselves with multiple professional roles. In 
addition to disciplinary training and research interests the role of audiences 
appears to be crucial for some of my respondents. For example, even though the 
following respondent does not hold a degree in botany (the respondent’s degrees 
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are in environmental biology and geography), they changed their answer when I 
asked about the role of audiences.  
 
[R] “I’d say I’m a botanist.” 
[C] “Would you use that for all audiences?” 
[R] “No, I’d probably say different things for different audiences. For the 
most general audience I’d say I’m a botanist because most people know what that 
is. For some audiences I’d say I’m a geographer and for some I’d say I’m a 
landscape ecologist. For some I might say I’m an environmental scientist, 
because it’s sort of general, and for some I’d say I’m a botanist because it’s 
tangible.”  
 
Like the respondent quoted above, many of these scientists were trained in 
an inter- and/or trans-disciplinary manner. Being able to see things from a more 
“general” environmental perspective also offered them a way to synchronize 
personal interests with training and thus identity with academic work. For 
example,  
“In terms of my subject area, I’ve been trained 
interdisciplinarily…. [But] how do I think of myself as a 
researcher? I think of myself as someone who has always been 
interested in coupled social-ecological systems, as someone who 
has wanted to move on to different fields every 5-7 years with the 
touchstone of ecology, but I like to be doing something new. So I 
haven’t seen my career trajectory as building towards being the 
leading expert in something so much as an opportunity to keep 
learning about new things.” 
 
Such remarks raise an interesting question: What makes an academic 
scientist an academic “environmental” scientist? I grappled with the concept 
“environmental scientist” for most of my research (it can seem too broad a 
classification, yet narrower terms such as “ecologist” may exclude others – e.g., 
environmental engineers – that should be included in this grouping). Upon 
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analyzing my results I developed a working definition with three criteria: AES 1) 
work beyond the limits of disciplinary visions, 2) turn environmental issues into a 
research agenda, and 3) seek to connect knowledge generation to a societal 
problem or use. 
 
Motivations for Being an Academic Environmental Scientist 
This dimension explores the personal motivations AES have for choosing 
and remaining in their career as an environmental scientist with their academic 
institutional affiliation.  
 
“One thing that always surprises me is when you look at standard 
basic science approaches, they spend all this time talking about 
their methods, right? Just to make sure that it’s very clear why they 
chose their methods, and talk about their data sources, and so forth. 
But rarely do they talk about their personal motivations for 
doing it. Which can be just as important as in defining those 
methods and data sources that they choose, but it’s often 
something that is excluded… people just don’t dare to go to 
there.”  
 
The quote above came from an interdisciplinary program administrated 
focused on the beneficial integration of science and society. Scientists “don’t dare 
to go there” because talking about how values influence their decisions is seen as 
not appropriately scientifically objective. The respondent was careful to explain 
that,  
“objectivity is an absolutism, and I’m always suspicious of 
absolute arguments of any kind. And, I think that we recognize that 
as human beings we can’t take on any kind of objective stance 
and really be true to ourselves.”  
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Respondents commented on how because science is a “human endeavor” 
scientists need to at least give some serious consideration to the human 
dimensions of their work throughout the research process. One respondent trained 
in and now teaching ecology suggested that, 
“Most of the people I see going into ecology had some sort of 
experience as a young person. Because why would you go into a 
field that isn’t going to pay you very much? [chuckles] We know 
this. If you are lucky you can get a job at an agency or something, 
but those jobs are competitive and hard to come by. So, you have 
to really feel something in order to go into it.... And most of the 
people I know have some sort of environmental value set 
behind them, is my guess, to choose this field of study.” 
 
I asked this respondent to elaborate on the suggestion that prospective 
ecologists are motivated to choose their field of study because of their 
environmental values.  
“…to me, education is going to play a very big role in establishing 
someone’s value systems…. [but I] didn’t want to influence my 
students. If they had different values than me doesn’t mean they 
can’t learn science from me.” 
 
Environmental values, like any other component of our worldviews, 
develop through interacting with other people (Norton, 1991). The classroom 
provides educational material and intellectual challenges for subjecting our 
beliefs, values, and ideas to passive improvement and active scrutiny. The subject 
matter itself is sufficient for this; the academic environmental scientist does not 
necessarily need to share their own values in the classroom. But there is a 
difference between overt efforts to do so, transmitting values by example, 
conscious and subconscious small nudged, etc. Regardless, professors usually 
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want to avoid unduly influencing their students’ values. As seen in the quote 
above, this is of high concern because such influence could keep the students 
from learning the subject matter in the first place. Many respondents gave 
teaching the public to be “ecologically literate” as a motivating reason for joining 
academia.  
When I asked my respondents why they decided to spend their time and 
energy in pursuing their degrees and getting into their field of study many spoke 
of curiosity as their motivator. For example, one remarked, “I was always 
interested in the question of why there are so many species.” Another indicated 
that “a love of the ocean” moved them toward their work. For these scientists, and 
for many others, studying the environment was the “natural transition.”  
It often took respondents some time to openly discuss that they were 
motivated by their environmental values, perhaps because of how they understand 
objectivity in relation to scientific credibility, or perhaps because of how they 
understand the roles of environmental values in scientific work. But, some 
recognized environmental values motivating their students. Furthermore, 
respondents who reported that their students’ are motivated by environmental 
values were also likely to find validity in applied science such as the respondent 
quoted below. 
“I think the attraction for most of the people that are coming 
into this field (ecology) are coming in with some desire to fix 
something or change something or be an environmentalist. I 
think the subset that is purely curiosity driven is probably a smaller 
subset…. [It’s important for students to] see how they fit in on 
that continuum: purely curiosity driven to doing something 
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that is a combination of curiosity with results that can be more 
immediately used.” 
 
For this respondent, who received their PhD in 1988, students of ecology 
have traditionally been driven by curiosity but they have seen a shift to greater 
emphasis on practical application. However, another respondent’s choice to 
pursue a BS in ecology in the second half the 1990s still pivoted on curiosity as 
expressed by the respondent below. 
“I went to summer camps like most kids and I got involved in 
nature [through 4H], and then it was time to go to college. I 
was 18 and idealistic, and I thought ‘do I want to do engineering or 
ecology?’ Engineering is too practical, so I went with being 
idealistic and studied ecology.”  
 
As shown in Table 4-1, the respondents included environmental scientists 
other than self identified ecologists. Scientists who came from the more applied 
sciences like engineering, geography, and justice studies were more likely to 
connect their curiosity to application and other non-academic institutions. 
“I was always interested in unevenness… and in understanding 
the processes behind those patterns… [I became] interested in 
the differentials in terms of people having access to power and 
opportunity… and the justice implications of it. But one of things I 
have realized [while at a particular [non-profit organization] annual 
award ceremony], I turned to one of the people and said, ‘It seems 
like my work is so irrelevant compared to what these people are 
doing. They are actually out there and they are making a difference 
in the local communities and so forth,’ and he said, ‘No, you guys 
need to do exactly what you are doing, keep on doing that, because 
it makes a difference when City Hall or the city planners start think 
of ways to modify what they are doing to the city, they are going to 
listen to you. And leave it to me to translate that information and 
actually work with people on the ground through this 
organization.’ So, in some senses, it’s a bit of a cop-out, but on the 
other hand, it’s a division of labor that might actually be an 
appropriate way of doing things. Nevertheless, that hasn’t stopped 
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me, I’ve always been thinking about ways I can actually take 
what I’m doing and think about it can be applied, actually 
intervene in the cities and ameliorate some of these injustices.” 
 
Sometimes pure curiosity can act as the sole motivator (nurtured through 
academic development) and other factors are recognized only upon reflection well 
after the fact. As one respondent put it, 
“I just became much more interested in ecological issues in 
graduate school as a result of the papers we were reading in 
courses, books that I was reading. It just drew my attention 
towards evolutionary ecology…. It was my exposure within an 
academic environment that showed me that this was a very 
interesting research area. But it also played to the whole set of 
unexpressed, deeper interests that I had going back to being a 
kid and even in college.” 
 
The respondent above explained that those deeper interests were “learning 
and teaching about the biology of critters.” A career in academia as an 
environmental scientist offers a way to align personal interests with research 
agendas and daily activities for many of the scientists interviewed. As another 
respondent shared, 
“If you are in an office all the time and you are a natural 
scientist then you are losing touch with the systems you are 
trying to study. You are becoming an administrator, not a 
researcher, and yuck. A lot of the work I do is administration, but 
that’s not going to get in way of me putting this on the door 
before I leave tonight (holds up note that reads, ‘OUT IN THE 
FIELD, BACK MONDAY’).” 
 
Allocating time to get outdoors into the systems the scientists are studying 
is part of being a natural scientist for this respondent and many others volunteered 
complementary sentiments. Some spoke of how they enjoy the traveling, hiking, 
and camping of fieldwork, and of bringing students into the field to help them 
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better understand not only their subject of study, but what a career in 
environmental science might hold for them.  
The different but patterned positions for enjoying nature suggests the 
question of how the environmental values within the category of the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment’s (MA) cultural ecosystem services (educational, 
intellectual, inspiration, recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual) influences decisions 
about joining the academic science and environmental communities. In keeping 
with grounded theory, I researched the MA later in the interview process and 
consequentially could ask direct questions about the MA framework late in the 
interview process. But, I was able to analyze the older interviews again and 
discovered the presence of MA environmental values I had not previously 
recognized. 
For example, the respondent who enjoys “teaching and learning about the 
biology of critters” was one of my first interviews. I listened to the interview and 
recoded to discover that they expressed the educational and inspirational cultural 
values. In contrast I interviewed the field biologist later in the process and was 
able to directly ask about the MA ecosystem services acting as categories of 
environmental values. I did so, however, after the field biologist explained they 
enjoy fieldwork because of its recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual cultural values.  
Decisions about higher education and career track development were 
made during the height of the environmental movement for some of the scientists 
I interviewed. Younger respondents made those decisions in the wake of the 
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environmentalism. It is out of necessity that AES address how they orient 
themselves and their work to environmentalism because society often perceives 
the association as strong and also as a point of attack on the validity of the science 
(as we saw in the policy advocacy debates discussed in chapter two).  
A consistent pattern emerged among the AES I interviewed.  There was 
often talk of environmentalist values providing an initial motivation for becoming 
an AES followed by a disassociation from environmentalism.  This was especially 
true among the respondents who spoke about how attending college during the 
1960s and 1970s affected their decisions to pursue a life in the environmental 
sciences. The two following quotes came from the same respondent at different 
parts of the interview. 
“I grew up in the era of the environmental movement of the 
70s, and Earth Day was happening, environmental laws were being 
passed; I knew I wanted to do something. I saw areas that were 
sprayed with insecticide and the birds weren’t there anymore. I 
was very much an environmentalist and wanted to do 
something to contribute…. [After taking a few undergraduate 
classes] I realized, oh, this what I really enjoy. It’s scientific. As a 
young adult, I would look at a plant and think, ‘Why is this plant 
growing here? How? Why?’” 
 
“I suppose the only real tradeoff [of being in academia] is perhaps 
suppression of my inherent—the emotional side of joy of 
working with plants and being outside. I sort of feel like it’s 
sort of inappropriate to express that as a serious scientist. I 
love my garden and my plants at home, so I still very much enjoy 
interacting with the natural world, but I guess I put a more serious 
hat on when I’m being a scientist [laughs]. I think this is a good fit 
for me.” 
 
Environmentalism motivated this respondent to become an AES but then 
they apparently decided to trade in environmentalism for professionalism at the 
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price of openly expressing joy. I thought it might be worthwhile to know what 
they have grown to think of environmentalism, now decades later. Their answer:  
“If someone called me an environmentalist, that I would not like, 
because I think there are many environmentalists who are too hair 
trigger quick to act and motivate, and they aren’t basing their 
actions on fact.” 
 
As established and respected scientists, it is common for AES to not want 
to be associated with actions that are perceived as not based on fact. As discussed 
in chapter two, acting on something other than facts implicates non-epistemic 
values, which is a flag for compromised objectivity and therefore impaired 
credibility and authority for scientists in general and for AES in particular. But 
this is changing for the current generation of students studying sustainability. As 
one respondent remarked,  
“A student today could go off in a direction of conservation 
biology or environmental science and still be successful. 
Sustainability science, right? Sustainability science; they can’t get 
away from an advocacy position…. It’s a mix that, for all practical 
purposes, didn’t exist at all when I was in college.” 
 
Others indicated that, although the environmental movement partially 
motivated their decisions to go into the environmental sciences in college, they 
did not self identify as an environmentalist primarily because of its association 
with advocacy. One scientist with a distinguished career in research and 
administration shared that the decision to study ecology in college was motivated 
by what was the “vernacular of the time, [to] save the world,” but later explained, 
“Early on in my career in graduate school, which was the late 
60s and early 70s, the environmental movement was alive and 
well. And then there was the more ‘dispassionate scientific 
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approach’… it was clear that if I wanted to be a successful 
scientist within the Department of Zoology and the Museum of 
Natural History, I was off on the dispassionate side. If I wanted 
[environmentalism], it was over at the School of Natural 
Resources…. It served my career. It was what I was really 
interested in at the time and I reasoned I could be more 
successful going down that route. The environmental movement 
at that time [was] a lot of advocacy, and the science, a lot of it, had 
to be worked out.” 
 
For most respondents coming out of the environmental movement the 
desire to contribute scientifically gave way to believing the movement was not 
scientifically grounded. This view emerged in step with becoming an academic 
ES. For others, the perception of the movement was that of advocacy without 
science from the onset. The decision to separate success and enjoying nature from 
the “unscientific” environmental movement was the solution of choice for the 
many of these respondents trained in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Younger AES varied, but continued this pattern of motivation followed by 
disassociation. One respondent went through a life stage of civil disobedience and 
avid Edward Abbey reading—“as a young person should!”—with their cohort 
around the turn of the millennium before shedding the environmentalist label. It is 
noteworthy to point out that this particular respondent expressed the highest 
degree of caution out of all the respondents when deciding whether or not to 
participate in this research. This scientist is an accomplished and respected AES, 
but with a higher level of scientific credibility came an increased level of concern 
that was only handled through granting anonymity. This AES was not alone in 
showing fear and exercising caution in the interviews I conducted. Another 
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Skype-based interview showed a similar degree of concern. The respondent was 
in their office on campus and they would periodically look over their shoulder 
while remarking that though they do not have these kinds of conversations with 
colleagues, they enjoy thinking about these ideas.  
Environmentalism as a movement aimed to cultivate environmental values 
into a social movement. The collective purpose of environmentalists in the 1960s 
and 70s was to impact policy and management practices, which in turn would 
transform lifestyles and worldviews. In a limited sense, it accomplished its short-
term goal of generating a wide assortment of new environmental laws and 
regulations to protect endangered species, environmental quality, and human 
welfare. But in another sense, it failed to be a strong cultivator of environmental 
values into society seen in the policy reformation of the 1970s aftermath, 
including the disassociation indicated by my respondents. As discussed in chapter 
two, this is at least partly because of the dominant philosophy of human 
separation from nature. One respondent recalled how when they took an 
undergraduate class in environmental science with a fieldwork assignment, they 
started to think about these things.  
“The thing that struck me, then I didn’t know that but I remember 
it and know that now it affected me, was one of the conditions was 
we needed to find a place without evidence that humans had been 
there…. Nothing visible. That struck me as odd… [T]his was back 
in the mid 70s when the environment was that which humans 
had nothing to do with, humans were not embedded in the 
environment. That was the origin I think, the seed, of thinking 
about what, at that time we didn’t even use the word sustainability, 
but what is now termed sustainability by putting humans back 
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in the environment and recognizing that we have impact by how 
we behave….  
 
If we are going to truly understand how to make sure that we don’t 
completely destroy this place, then we take that approach [i.e. 
sustainability], rather than one where the environment is pristine if 
it weren’t for humans. The framing of that time, and frankly for 
that time for better or for worse, probably was what was 
necessary, but it didn’t get us as far as it could because it 
polarized communities between those who were hugging the 
trees and those that wanted to cut it down.” 
 
The environmental movement lost, or possibly never gained, a significant 
amount of its academic scientific constituency. The respondents whom I 
interviewed found other ways to express their environmental values outside of 
environmentalism by connecting their personal interests with research agendas 
and with their personal lives.  
Some use their skills in systems-level thinking to study environmental 
issues by addressing global relationships, sustainability, regional management 
issues, and climate adaptation science. Or they facilitate other scientists, for 
example, by acting as academic administrators. They also spoke of how they 
enjoy camping, hiking, traveling, and other outdoor activities in their spare time. 
These scientists often commented on how they spend a significant—if not 
majority—of their time on a computer writing papers and grant proposals, and 
responding to emails.  
The other group made their research careers a way to “get paid to do 
[their] hobby,” which is spending time outdoors doing field research and having 
their science “move ahead the understanding in the field.” It is worth pointing out 
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that not every administrator I interviewed found that such activities detract from 
enjoying their career. One respondent with extensive administrative experience 
thought about whether they would change anything about their career and stated,  
“No, I wouldn’t. I feel pretty good—I feel very good about the 
career track that I’ve had. I think I’ve had a good ride. I’m 
comfortable to the commitment to the administration as well as the 
straight research.” 
 
As mentioned earlier, I offered a thought experiment to my research 
respondents by asking what they would do with their lives if they had unlimited 
resources of time, money, and ability to work with anyone. For most of the 
respondents, within the first few seconds of answering this question they placed 
themselves into one of two categories, and these categories correlate with the two 
approaches outlined above. Those that described spending too much time working 
on a computer wanted to change what they were doing. Examples were putting 
research aside and get involved in community development through local organic 
farming, teaching capacity building in Africa, marriage equality rights, or getting 
back into the field to conduct their research. I believe these types of answers are 
exemplified by wanting to find ways to “make a big difference [such that] you 
could point to it and say ‘look what difference I made’,” and academia does not 
always offer that kind of personal satisfaction.   
But the majority of those whose research interests, agenda, and activities 
matched wanted to keep doing exactly what they were doing. A few said they 
“wouldn’t change a thing.” Why stop when your life’s activities are your hobbies? 
As one respondent expressed it, “I feel privileged to do what I love.” This 
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statement captures the essence of the responses given by respondents in this 
group. 
Both sets of respondents wanted to connect their daily activities to 
contributing to good, which was predominantly an environmental good, but also 
social good.24 Some were able to do that through their research in a satisfactory 
way and others imagined alternative routes to achieving that end. The MA 
supporting, provisional, and regulatory environmental values are constitutive 
goals in the AES community. One respondent quoted below summarized this 
well. 
“I think you need to recognize that scientists are people, too, and 
that they have values, and it’s probably going to direct where they 
conduct their research and the kinds of questions that they ask, but 
in the end, they are doing things that can make a real difference in 
terms of things we rely on for our survival, livelihoods, wellbeing 
and so forth.”  
 
After inviting the respondents to reflect upon what they truly value by 
thinking about what they would ideally do with their life, I thought it would be 
revealing to ask what actual value they see coming out of their professional lives 
as a researcher and an educator. Besides “want[ing] the classic academic 
accomplishments,” the majority of respondents were also solaced by the belief 
that their research fits into a system of effecting social change. They described 
this in two ways: managers and other decision-makers use their research, and 
                                                 
24
 Working from the perspective that man is part of nature, solving social 
problems can often help solve environmental problems in the process. One 
respondent discussed how higher education rates among women decrease birth 
rates, which contributes towards a reduction in environmental resource extraction.  
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students are engaged through education and mentorship. This will be developed in 
more depth in Conditions of Academic Conditioning and Engaging Policy.  
This dimension suggests the generational differences found between the 
younger and older respondents in addition to how these current AES community 
members think about future members. Environmentalism played a significant role 
in motivating people to become environmental scientists, but its associated 
emotions are sometimes suppressed as a part of being a professional scientist in 
academia. The changes in academic science are offering new ways for current and 
incoming scientists to act on their values by contributing to environmental and 
social goods with their science. In the process, this is changing the acceptability 
of advocacy in the process, which is especially salient in sustainability science. 
 
Conditions of Academic Conditioning  
Academia is the institution where the cycle of training and employing 
academic environmental scientists can be, and not uncommonly is, continuous. It 
employs AES to be researchers, educators, and administrators, and as a result 
these scientists train the next generation of members in addition to other 
scientists, professionals, and citizens in general. But, as mentioned in Introduction 
to Respondents and Results, there are some contentious issues. 
“I’m not really interested in sitting in the ivory tower… my 
whole life I’ve done what interesting to scientists, because what’s 
interesting to scientists is solving problems, and solving puzzles. 
We create fancy puzzles and try to come up with solutions. It’s 
all a Rubik’s Cube™. For science to be valuable, for us to justify 
public funding for science, for all these policy related things, we 
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need to figure out ways to connect this stuff back to things that 
matter…. [The trouble is] the unresolved issues in the policy 
sphere aren’t resolved by academics because they aren’t 
academic questions.” 
  
The respondent quoted above is one of the younger generation AES and 
has a training background in applied ecology. Other respondents shared the belief 
that academic scholars and their work have a history of social and political 
irrelevance due to how academia is structured. The respondent from the quote 
above offered their opinion for what is wrong. 
"We’re used to applying science to solving problems, right, which 
requires things other than science…. At the very least, it requires a 
normative framework for evaluating objectives…. One framework 
is not sufficient, but it is necessary…. You need a way to make 
tradeoffs…. We train really great scientist at doing really great 
positive science. We spend very little time training those same 
people in thinking what is a normative problem. Most of them 
don’t even know what the word means. And, almost no time in 
how to make tradeoffs." 
 
 In a different part of the interview, this respondent expressed further 
frustration because “universities are sold as education, and us as teachers: we are 
not. We are here to generate knowledge.” This statement seems to conflicts with 
the history of how American academia was set up to bridge teaching academies 
with research universities (Rosenberg, 1961). Additionally, it was not clear whose 
responsibility it is to teach normativity to students given the respondent’s position 
that academics are not teachers. 
 My respondents felt frustrated about this, but no one expressed feelings of 
disempowerment when interacting with students. Indeed, respondents who 
perceived the gap between knowledge and action often treated it as one that can 
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be overcome by explicitly talking about values and tradeoffs in the classroom and 
when mentoring students. One respondent particularly interested in how academia 
and other institutions can contribute to social and environmental problem solving 
stated: 
“One of the first things I have students do is write their 
worldview and talk about how it affects the kinds of questions 
that they ask and the kinds of priorities they have for 
sustainability. And I do that deliberately so that they know when 
they are coming in, that their worldview is going to make a 
difference for how they view the world—not to be redundant—but 
it’s going to make a different how they interact with other studies, 
what articles and books they tend to key in on, and what they tend 
to ignore. I want them to be totally aware of that.” 
 
Many respondents mentioned value considerations in the context of 
making their own career path choice to work in academia compared to federal 
agencies and private industry. The respondent below worked at a federal agency 
for a few years before deciding they wanted to conduct independent research and 
eventually become an academic. But there are tradeoffs in academia, too.  
“The only real negative tradeoff of going into academia—and 
this maybe real or perceived—there are other opportunities if 
you want to live a higher economic caliber of life. Basically, 
there are other ways to go with your degree to make more money, 
and I have friends who do that [with environmental consulting]…. 
They make a lot of money, they drive fast cars, they have big, 
crazy houses, but, you know, I don’t see them as being happy 
[laughs]…. That’s the only real tradeoff. And what none of those 
folks will ever have is the opportunity to mentor students, and 
that’s hugely important to me. I don’t have kids of my own, so 
my legacy is going to be the legacy I leave behind with my 
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students. So I take it very seriously. You can’t do that at the [a 
federal agency], you can’t do that at CH2M HILL.”25 
 
Many respondents believed that though they could have a better salary if 
employed by a different institution, teaching and mentoring is “where the rewards 
are coming from.” For some, working closely with students was their way of 
leaving a legacy, whether it is because they don’t have children of their own, or to 
inspire the next generation of AES practitioners. 
“Frankly, one of the biggest values we contribute is training the 
next generation of people to get frustrated about all of this 
[laughs] and then it just repeats. Or not. I’m not convinced all 
scientists are as frustrated as I am.” 
 
Others expressed taking pride in helping young scientists go on to 
accomplish great things, challenging students to think through their implicit value 
positions, to become “ecologically literate citizens”, act as a fair mediator of 
normative perspectives for policy, and problem-solve with systems of complexity 
and uncertainty. One respondent with administrative responsibilities connected 
generational change with more positive contingencies. 
“Unfortunately, we always try to put our hope on the next 
generation. It’s like, ‘oh, we wrecked it, so let’s leave it to the 
next generation to figure it out.’ But, that’s what I am trying to do 
in this school, is try to communicate these ideas to students from 
the very beginning. You might work with people that are stuck in 
the lab all day long, but you might be the person that can bridge 
those multiple constituencies of knowledge and use it as a way 
to actually move policy toward the normative dimension of 
                                                 
25
 CH2M HILL is an environmental management and planning firm. 
http://www.ch2m.com/corporate/services/environmental_management_and_plann
ing/default.asp  
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what we want our future to look like. How many it will stick 
with and how many will be effective at doing that, I hope a lot.” 
 
Some respondents were concerned that currently too much hope is placed 
on the next generation rather than investing enough time and energy on improving 
the conditions for the actually practicing scientists. One respondent from an 
interdisciplinary and solution-oriented school expressed particular dissatisfaction. 
"There was some talk [in this school] about how we evaluate our 
tenure and promotion decisions. The academic stool has three legs; 
the big fat one is research, and the two skinny ones are teaching 
and service. Service does not very effectively fit. One of things we 
tell our students, and preach to our students and teach to our 
students [here] is that the work we do needs to be societally 
relevant and it should be solutions oriented to the extent that it 
can be, and it should be actionable. As faculty, we should be 
expected to do these things…. 
 
[T]here were discussions of adding a fourth leg to our 
academic ‘stool’: of action. Faculty would be judged… on the 
extent to which their research especially, but also their teaching 
and service, are spinning into things they can demonstrate are 
actionable…. If a faculty member can demonstrate that their 
involvement in x solution based project or organization or 
movement actually facilitated a solution being generated or 
sped something up, that would count as action. I can’t imagine 
that any traditional disciplinary departments would ever consider 
that fourth leg. Here, where we are supposed to be 
[interdisciplinary and solution-oriented], that fourth leg is still 
being debated.” 
 
Partly, the reason for this is the incentive structures in place within 
academia. A transition is taking place as identified by the fact that adding this 
“fourth leg” of action is even being discussed at all. One respondent who has a 
history of being an “institutional architect,” commented that,  
“I recognize, and I still do, that universities are really bad at 
managing. Faculty are horrible at managing things, particularly this 
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new kind of institution that is a boundary spanning organization 
between academia and practical use.” 
 
Every respondent agreed on the importance of finding ways to use the 
knowledge generated in academia to directly cause beneficial action. They looked 
for it inside academia through the increasingly prevalent science of sustainability. 
Some used their credibility and authority to plug their research into non-profit 
organizations, management, and policy spheres through conference attendance 
(and a couple mentioned sometimes getting a beer afterwards, too), participation 
in stakeholder meetings and even collaboration. Others use their specific topical 
expertise to inform management policy. Of these different approaches, 
respondents were either highly or hardly active, but both types of respondents 
frequently expressed they were not able to do as much as they would like. One 
respondent took a particular approach to time commitments. 
“I think I was more ambitious when I was young. I think I thought 
we could save the world…. I don’t think there’s a single event that 
changed my views. It may just be a way of allowing myself to not 
work insane hours. If you think you have it within your reach to 
save the world and you don’t try, what does that say about you as a 
person? So it might just be a really convenient excuse to say, 
‘well, I can’t really save the world,’ and now I get to live a 
balanced life. I’m serious about that; a lot of my colleagues 
don’t have a balanced life at all. I fell in love relatively late in 
life and turned around and thought that there’s importance in 
being a good [spouse], a good [child], a good [sibling], and a 
good friend. And maybe that’s as important as anything I 
could accomplish with my science. So again, it may just be a 
convenience because I absolved myself from having to try too 
hard…. But that’s the personal side. The professional agenda is 
still motivated by global environmental challenges. I just don’t 
think it should take over my life.” 
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Being an academic requires significant time commitments and adding 
things to the list of academic expectations seems to be seen as directly taking time 
away from the other activities, especially research efforts. At least some 
respondents reconsider this tradeoff as seen in how and why they approach 
teaching different research objectives to their students. But what are the personal 
motivations of doing environmental science and being an environmental scientist?  
"Once in a while you hear people talk about how much they 
enjoy x part of what they are doing. And for natural scientists, 
most of the time you hear people talking about that, it when 
you are out in the field with them, right? Because when you get 
out from under the fluorescent lights and into the systems we are 
studying, x. And they’ll be like, ‘wow, this is why we do this!’… 
But usually there’s so much else to talk about, that waxing 
philosophical about why we are doing what we are doing 
doesn’t usually come up. [laughs]” 
 
More than one respondent opined how incentive structures are keeping 
them from pursuing socially relevant applications of their research and yet went 
on to downplay their motivations for making fundamental life decisions like 
choosing a career. I asked the respondent quoted above why those introspective 
conversations weren’t happening.  
“I don’t think the conversation doesn’t happen because anybody is 
inhibited or doesn’t want to talk about it. I think that—you know 
perfectly well that we are all completely strapped for time…. The 
time you get with colleagues very rarely involves sitting 
around, relaxing with a glass of wine, talking about things that 
aren’t directly related to something you need from them or 
they need from you or you both need from someone else.” 
 
Some respondents voiced this sentiment. As one put it, “It’s not that it is 
actively being suppressed, but you aren’t rewarded for it. So it gets suppressed 
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because you are only rewarded for publishing papers.” They saw that the structure 
of incentives in academia limits investing time in applying their research, but did 
not see this same system restricting their time for thinking about how 
environmental values motivated their environmental science career decisions. As 
long as these academics get what they think they need from the academic 
colleagues then there isn’t a recognized concern to motivate change.  
Another respondent’s views summarize these ideas of teaching current 
students to be applied from the beginning while the current AES generation is 
making this transition in their own research perspective without fully 
understanding why. 
[R] “There needs to be a balance between providing students with foundational 
knowledge, earth systems, and social systems. But they really need to understand 
how they interrelate, how they interact, the feedback relationships between them. 
And in addition to that, the students need to be able to understand how to use 
that knowledge to focus on creating solutions…. Most of the people in 
[interdisciplinary and solution-oriented school] were trained just like me. 
They are trained to basically answer science questions of why and not really 
care about what happens after that.” 
[C] “They are academics.” 
[R] “Yeah.” 
[C] “So do you ever hear your colleagues talk about why they do the work 
that they do?” 
[R] “Not very often… not very often… not very often…(thinking hard) I 
don’t know why that’s the case. It could be that it’s obvious why they do their 
research. They do their research because they enjoy it; they are curious people. 
They do their research because they like being able to ask their own questions 
rather than having someone else ask them what to do to. I think that’s a huge 
motivator of people in academia.” 
[C] “But they are applied. There is more than just curiosity.” 
[R] “Absolutely. So, I mean there are people—there’s a spectrum. There are some 
people that are wary of doing anything that hints of advocacy, for instance. They 
think that might sully their results. Those people are increasingly in the minority. 
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I think the majority of people now recognize that fundamental social 
questions are just as relevant a beginning point as so called ‘blind science’…. 
I think people are doing their research to make a difference. But it’s not 
always expressed as much as it should be.”  
 
Respondents who reflected on why such conversations with their 
colleagues are uncommon fit with the suggestion provided above, i.e. they don’t 
perceive much of a reason to. One AES stated, “No, we don’t ever talk about why 
because most of us do it without thinking about why,” and another said, “It’s just 
understood. We don’t have conversations about that.” 
Two respondents specifically associated imbibing alcohol with the thought 
of questioning personal motivations, implying that such thoughts are reserved for 
leisure time. Which, as discussed above, can be difficult to acquire for academics 
who are “strapped for time.” Put another way, the demands academia places on 
time limit both opportunities for applying research and contemplating the 
foundational motivations for doing their work. Arguably, if individual AES are 
not familiar with probing their own motivations, then it is difficult for them to 
share their thoughts about their motivations. 
That said, recreational, aesthetic, spiritual, inspirational and other cultural 
values came up often when I asked respondents about how personal experiences 
influenced their worldview. These environmental values are the cultural 
ecosystem services in the MA framework seem to be the accepted context for 
wanted to be a “natural scientist,” yet these cultural environmental values are also 
treated at the unacceptable non-epistemic values that detract from the credibility 
of science. 
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[C] Do you hold environmental values? 
[R] “I think a lot about of my values because they come from my experiences…. 
Growing up, I spent hours wandering through the forest and through the creek 
behind my parents’ house… over the course of growing up I watched beavers 
come in and completely change the system…. It was neat, it was formative. A lot 
of the values that I think I hold about natural systems and why I’m so 
interested in studying them have to come from those formative years when I 
was out watching things happen and thinking ‘Wow! It’d be really to cool to 
understand what this means and how this whole system is different now’…. But 
I’m not sure I answered your question.” 
[C] “Let me make sure I understand. You’ve identified recreational values—
you like to go out and hike around and so forth since you were young. Earlier you 
talked about the fallacy of preservation, so the preservationist value is not 
something you ascribe to.” 
[R] “Yeah, it’s just absurd.” 
[C] “But you are interested in this cultural-environmental relationship. And 
you talked about ecosystem services earlier and that means you might hold 
certain instrumental values from supportive to provisional to regulatory to 
spiritual—“ 
[R] “Absolutely, and aesthetic.” 
[C] “And you described that when you are out in the field that is when you 
and your colleagues are happiest, that there is some kind of value experience 
happening there that makes [you and your colleagues] happy.” 
[R] (respondent is hemming and hawing) “Absolutely.” 
[C] “So you’ve covered it all.” 
[R] “Yeah!” 
[C] “It’s just one of those things you may not have realized.” 
[R] “Okay, okay, yeah, cool!” (we both share a laugh) 
[C] “I just said everything back to you that you told me.” 
[R] “Yeah, right, good, okay. This is fun stuff!” 
 
The ecosystem ecology respondents all identified or agreed with the four 
types of MA ecosystem services categories of cultural, provisional, regulatory, 
and supportive services discussed in chapter two as reasons for doing their 
research. Understanding and working to ensure the continuation of these 
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ecosystems services seem to be the goals of doing environmental science, making 
them constitutive values. Additionally, provisional services (e.g. food, water, 
shelter) emerged as the highest perceived priority in greater society. 
“Until everyone is wealthy enough and feels like they have the 
healthcare that they need, the food that they need, I just don’t 
see people caring about the environment in the way they 
should. They should for the future of the human race. But if you’re 
really constrained with problems that are more important, like 
feeding your family, then you’re never going to get there.” 
 
So then, what are environmental values? One respondent was able to 
phrase their response concisely and eloquently.  
"Environmental values are our beliefs about how nature benefits 
us, and what that means in return for our responsibilities towards 
nature." 
 
Others were unsure how to make sense of the term “environmental 
values.” One respondent explained they always had these thoughts but didn’t 
know to call them “environmental values” until a departmental colleague versed 
in environmental ethics explained the terminology. When I asked another 
respondent (in the same department as the previous respondent) what 
environmental values are, they said, 
[R] “I don’t know. I’m not familiar with that term.” 
[C] “So, then what do you think values are?” 
[R] “Values are the importance different stakeholders give to different 
things.” 
[C] “Okay. With that, environmental values would be the result of how 
stakeholders give different weights of importance to environmental things.” 
[R] “Versus cultural or other things. Material things. Sure. ” 
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Though this respondent could define “value” they were not familiar with a 
definition of “environmental value.” Even though the respondent had no such 
conception of “environmental value” to articulate, the respondent still revealed 
their preconceptions about it referring to material things and not cultural things. 
This supports the pattern that AES interviewed permit the material categories of 
ecosystem services (supportive, regulatory, and provisional) as constitutive 
environmental values. At the same time, they are mixed on whether and how to 
treat the nonmaterial ecosystem service of cultural benefits as contextual 
environmental values. This raises the question of how safeguarded the epistemic 
value of science is when such values are not transparently discussed and honestly 
scrutinized. This will be discussed more in the next section due to how the 
“excess of objectivity” (Sarewitz, 2004) grips AES, or as one respondent 
described it, 
“Perhaps it is a way in our community to perpetuate the values that 
we say are really important in our culture. If you can say, hey look, 
you can be attacked from outside and then oh boy, we are being 
attacked from the outside so we better be even more value neutral 
or better at being objective. Somehow it might be a mechanism we 
employ ourselves perhaps without even realizing.” 
 
 As Longino (1990) explains, the objectivity of a community requires 
public interrogation of values, beliefs, and ideas. The method of scrutiny is 
similar to the peer-review system currently in place for transforming scientific 
data into fact through socialized critics, but of course requires more. This 
discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis, but is an essential issue to address 
for the future development of post-positivism. For now, I point out that such 
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scrutiny necessitates a high degree of transparency but this would appear to be 
rebuffed by the defense mechanisms of many AES.  
The AES interviewed are becoming more socially relevant, more aware of 
environmental values, and more are training the next generation differently than 
how they were trained by emphasizing exactly these ideas. But this is not 
ubiquitous. Some AES still “train [their] students the way [they were] trained,” 
following in the tradition of scientific inquiry solely for inquiry’s sake. 
 
 
Objectivity, Credibility, and Authority 
 
[C] “How do you understand objectivity?” 
[R] “People that are objective are generating hypotheses and testing them 
and then interpreting the data and then using the data to inform the 
decision-making.” 
[C] “That’s a very textbook answer. Do you think that is actually attainable?” 
[R] “Yes!” 
[C] “Yes?! And do you think you are being objective in your research?” 
[R] “Yes!” 
[C] “Yes!?” 
[R] “Absolutely! As a matter of fact, I think every scientist should 
strive to be objective…. As scientists it is our responsibility to maintain 
objectivity. It can be difficult sometimes, don’t get me wrong, but that 
is our responsibility. We are only supposed to generate the data. We 
like to say the data are what they data are. That’s it. Then you generate 
other experiments to test things and gain other information.  
[C] [briefly explained the post-positivist critique of how values function in 
science, particularly the judgment of hypotheses] What do you think about 
this? 
[R] I guess I really haven’t thought about it that much. I mean, my training 
as a scientist has always been one to be hypothesis driven. We generate 
descriptive data to formulate hypotheses, but the whole goal is to hypothesis 
driven…. Thinking about [the Darwinian Revolution] in terms of a Kuhnian 
paradigm, you have to think about everything being aligned just right and then 
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you have this huge shift. I think that clearly occurs, so I do realize that there is 
some level of objectivity relative to how one sets up and picks the 
experiments one does.  
 
To summarize previous statements, objectivity is complex and is 
predominately understood as essential for doing good science with its two 
components: descriptive accuracy and value neutrality (a.k.a. freedom from 
values). When asked to share their thoughts about what objectivity means to them, 
many respondents provided a somewhat textbook positivist answer like the one 
above. Of those, some believed this and most used it as a foil to emphasize the 
differences between positivist objectivity and their own interpretation. As one put 
it, “scientists that claim they are absolutely 100% objective in everything they 
do—they are either completely emotionless robots, or they are deluding 
themselves.” A few others expressed skepticism because objectivity is an 
absolutist notion and/or found the whole concept to be dishonest. The usage of 
candid and colorful language to express this point implies that at least some 
respondents found the concept of objectivity so implausible that poking fun at it is 
acceptable. The normative and descriptive meanings of objectivity were often 
grouped together such that objectivity became a transition term for connecting 
normative and descriptive issues within science.  
One respondent described what they termed the “boardwalk phenomenon” 
based on their experiences with objectivity when studying wetlands and 
interacting with policy-makers.  The discussion seems particularly interesting and 
revealing, and so it is worth considering their remarks at length: 
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“[I’m involved in] the coproduction of knowledge with the 
people that can actually use that knowledge to make better 
informed decisions. Philosophically, it’s a sort ‘sticky wicket,’26 I 
think, for a lot of scientists in general. First of all, the normative 
‘we should do this, we should do that’ thing in a lot of people’s 
minds steps over the line into advocacy—or even worse, 
activism, right? Most scientists view that as something that’s 
bad, because as soon become an advocate, whether you think 
so or not, you are perceived as losing your objectivity, or at 
least as less objective. And as soon as you become an activist, you 
now are actually lobbying for, or actively promoting, a particular 
sometimes normative view of the world. It’s very hard to defend 
that kind of thing with purely objective data. It’s not 
impossible. There’s a line there, and I call it the boardwalk 
phenomenon.  
 
… [A] lot of Birkenstock wearing ecologists think there are 
pristine places away from human impact (I’ll argue those don’t 
exist)… but there are Birkenstock wearing ecologists that think 
they are working in one of those places. The first thing you do 
when you get to one of those places is build a boardwalk 
because you don’t want your footprints or your presence to in 
any way to alter the system that you are studying, otherwise it’s 
not the pristine system you are supposed to be studying, right?  
 
When you take your science to policy-makers and let them 
decide what it means, you are still following the boardwalk 
analogy. When you become actively involved in that policy-
making, or you allow those policy-makers to be involved in your 
objective scientific knowledge generation, people perceive that as 
doing work without building a boardwalk first. How can you 
study a [system]—objectively—if part of what you are doing is 
actually modifying [it]?  
 
I think we can work in cities and in places like the Everglades 
without boardwalks, and I think we need to accept that we can do 
that. Fundamentally, there’s an illusion that by building those 
boardwalks, and you can view those as physical structures or 
metaphorical analogies, … that we studying those systems 
                                                 
26
 A helpful review explained that this is a metaphorical term for a 
difficult situation. It originates from the game of cricket: a sticky wicket happens 
when the playing field is compromised by rain and sun causing the ball to bounce 
unpredictably. 
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without in any way, shape, or form impacting it. That’s 
ridiculous. I think it’s ridiculous. Get over yourselves and 
acknowledge that you need to be part of the system. Things aren’t 
going to change in the right direction or change quickly enough if 
we don’t involve ourselves in that process.” 
 
Both boardwalks are intended to prevent contamination. When studying 
wetlands a boardwalk is a physical structure and its use will prevent the activity of 
humans from tainting pristine natural sites. With similar naïveté, believing all 
interactions with policy-makers that step outside the pristine realm of objectivity 
slip into the subjective quagmire of acting as an advocate or activist is overly 
simplistic and inhibits effective science-policy communication.27 This respondent 
believes the very idea that such interactions can be prevented—a.k.a. the 
interactions are objective—is a “ridiculous” “illusion”. 
Another respondent offered a completely different view on objectivity. 
“I think there are degrees of objectivity. My values may dictate 
what questions I ask, but I could still bring a fair amount of 
objectivity to answering that question. The value of science is 
that it is internally self-consistent, it is replicable, and there is a set 
of rules saying when we can or cannot add to the body of 
knowledge. And I think that has value even if some subjectivity 
creeps in. Can science be wholly objective? No. Does that mean 
it’s wholly subjective? No. Understanding what we are and are 
not most objective about and most subjective about would be 
extremely useful.” 
 
Table 4-2 below summarizes the respondents’ views of positivist objectivity. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 It is interesting to note the wetland boardwalk “protects” nature from the 
scientists where the policy boardwalk “protects” the scientists from politics. One 
is a good swamp, the other, a bad swamp. 
   78 
Table 4-2 Respondents’ Views of Objectivity 
Objectivity is value neutrality and 
descriptive accuracy as practiced by 
individuals. (positivism) 
Why? 
It’s “real and necessary” To protect science’s credibility 
and authority 
It’s “ridiculous” “Science is a human endeavor” 
It’s “suspicious”  
Not quite, because it’s a “matter of degree” 
 
The conversation developed differently with another respondent by 
discussing the post-positivist critique of science and its dismantling effect of 
objectivity, traditionally understood. I asked if this means values are inescapable 
in science, to which the respondent replied, “I think it’s probably true, but it’s 
something we are going to have to live with.” 
Three significant ideas developed throughout my interview with this 
respondent and they merged at the culmination of the interview. First, we opened 
up the relationship between emotions and values, realizing that one can describe 
values without necessarily being emotional.  
 
[C] “You had said earlier in the work place it’s not appropriate to show emotions. 
But emotions are different from values. Emotions are how you sometimes act out 
the values you that you hold. You could be perfectly stoic when describing the 
certain values you may have or the values others may have—” 
[R] “—That’s true—” 
[C] “—You need not necessarily be emotional about.” 
[R] “Yes. I think I was implying that a sort of passion is in there and that 
would be inappropriate to show in the work place.” 
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Second, they posited that some sort of guidelines could be put in place to 
help scientists handle their values’ roles in their research. Furthermore, the 
respondent thought one “could also argue that that is the role of the universities” 
in addition to professional societies.  
“Objectivity is a constant challenge, and we constantly need to be 
reminded of that. Take more ethics classes, or take any ethics class 
periodically. For the professors, maybe—we have to get our 
driver’s license renewed and you have to do a series of tests, 
maybe there should be a periodic 7 year test... about how you 
teach. You know, [take] a teaching class about ethics.” 
 
 
Third, they reflected on how an early career experience with the peer-
review process taught them “some lessons.” 
I can remember a few early papers—or reports—that I wrote… and 
the review comments came back saying ‘this shows bias.’ At that 
point I hadn’t realized I was carrying bias. Let’s protect this river 
versus let’s understand this river and understand the factors that 
influence the river so I can hand that information over to someone 
to use it. I learned some lessons early in my career. I didn’t 
realized I had this bias, but it was pointed out to me through 
peer-review.” 
 
This led the conversation into a discussion about peer-review. The 
respondent explained that the purpose of it is to function as a large-scale method 
of not only “checking for errors” in the experimental set up or data analysis, but 
“exposing personal values implicit in the science” by giving people with different 
worldviews the opportunity to review and provide constructive feedback. Later in 
the interview I asked about how objectivity can handle the post-positivism 
critiques and the respondent returned to peer-review. 
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[R] “Having a more robust peer-review system might help, giving more value 
to the peer-review process. I mean, I have this boiler plate paragraph that I use 
[when] people make these same sort of errors, same sort of [problematic] value-
judgments….” 
[C] “Can we ever actually be wholly objective?” 
[R] “No, but I think that if we can get enough multiple view points in there, 
rather than be reviewed by the same small group that may have the same 
worldview that you have and are just reinforcing that, by bringing in larger 
perspectives to the review process [we can be more objective].” 
 
I proposed a synthesis of these ideas to the respondent. 
 
[C] “Returning to our conversation about communication of our values amongst 
colleagues, if this conversation were able to take place at a large enough scale, 
could you have that same system of checks that peer-review currently uses such 
that we have a more open peer-review system of how our social, political, and 
especially our environmental values, and so forth influence our science?” 
[R] “That would fantastic!” 
 
In keeping with grounded theory, I read Longino’s (1990) argument for 
how peer-review can expand to include the interrogation of values after this 
interview. Finding out after the fact that this is essentially Longino’s suggestion 
for legitimately integrating values into the social practice of science corroborates 
the viability of this idea.  
Regardless of the respondents’ views of what objectivity is, most 
respondents expressed similar opinions about how objectivity relates to credibility 
and authority in the scientific community.  
"Well if you haven’t ever done anything that has been 
documented—I hate to say it—documented objectively by your 
peers, then you don’t have any authoritative ground to stand on. A 
[young scientist] that hasn’t gotten any paper published, or grants 
funded, or really made a name for him or herself, is not going to be 
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able to be an expert in a court case that involves scientific 
credibility and from that, authority." 
 
In other words, one must build credibility out of objectivity and authority 
out of credibility. Credibility was often talked about in tangible terms of having a 
track record of peer-reviewed publications and getting grants funded. But, 
scientific authority and credibility can be lost or compromised if objectivity is not 
strictly adhered to.  
“Any time a scientist says ‘we should do x, y, and z’ they are 
stepping out of the objective and into the normative, and they 
lose their credibility and their authority. I don’t think that’s the 
case, but when you are in an adversarial position, you have to be 
prepared for the fact that’s going to be one of the arguments 
probably used.” 
 
But another form of credibility kept coming up, and it could be gained or 
lost in its own way. 
"In terms of the colleagues that I have, a lot of whom are also 
friends, I think the assumption is that those values and that 
caring about the environment is there… and if in the process of 
working with someone you found out that it isn’t, then… I 
think a lot of us would be dealing with negative credibility on 
their part. I think where we get positive credibility is from much 
more tangible things, like the impact of a journal article or getting 
a $5 million NSF grant funded. But I know from personal 
experience that the values part can generate positive credibility 
spin outside of the comfort zone of your colleagues." 
 
Some respondents associated their positive environmental values—their 
shared “caring about the environment”—with the foundation of their 
environmental credibility and this is different from the “tangible things” that build 
scientific credibility.  
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For scientists to have scientific authority they must have scientific 
credibility, which comes from at least some form of objectivity. As a result of this 
relationship, when objectivity is perceived as compromised scientific credibility is 
lost and authority along with it. In parallel, certain positive environmental values 
are required to build environmental credibility. And if someone with this 
environmental credibility is found to not have certain positive environmental 
values, then that credibility is lost.  
This sets up a paradox: if AES must be value neutral (with respect to non-
epistemic values) in order to be objective and build their scientific credibility and 
authority, and if AES must hold certain positive environmental values in order to 
be environmentally credible, then how can these scientists be both objective and 
act on environmental values? One well established AES proved that it is possible 
and suggested a way to rationally solve the paradox.  
"I work most commonly [in] the environmental community, it’s 
inevitable that you’re seen as somewhat of a fellow traveler at 
least in holding values relative as seeing the world ... you gain 
certain credibility.... [A]nother part of my credibility comes 
from the capacity to be a fair arbiter.... I think that combination 
has been very important and influential in this whole area of 
[normative environmental issues] where I can publish a paper [and 
people know] it’ll be nuanced and intellectually rigorous 
position… and honest." 
 
This introduces an additional component to authority that was not 
previously addressed: fair arbitration. I asked this respondent to elaborate on their 
understanding of their environmental and scientific credibility with respect to 
authority.  
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"Folks are quite willing to regard judges as authority figures in 
society and their job is to interpret the fact relative to the law as 
law is understood at that time, law can change just like science. In 
that sense, scientists are some combination of that authority 
that comes along with being a judge but also contributes to 
what is being interpreted…. When they do these public opinion 
polls, scientists come out very high, much higher than political 
individuals or business leaders. Scientists really are seen as 
individuals as people we can look to for an honest opinion." 
 
Other respondents also referred to the ranking of scientists in public 
opinion polls. But it seems this respondent cited this as a consequence of 
scientific credibility (i.e. honestly interpreting and producing science) balanced 
with environmental credibility (i.e. legitimately contributing to normative 
environmental issues) to create this particular type of authority that affords them 
the opportunity to express their “opinion” as long as it is “honest.” I continued to 
ask this respondent how they were able to develop this skill. 
“I haven’t had [any] training in mediation, but I have had training 
in how to reason as a scientist, and therefore be able to represent 
all sides—or at least explore myself mentally—all sides of an issue 
before going forward on one particular view.” 
 
The ability to a good mediator is not only taught indirectly through 
scientific training, but also potentially exercised in the classroom when it comes 
to values in addition to the science. The respondent continued, 
“If you are going to be a good mediator, then you are going to 
get all sides equally represented on the table. And the students 
can then weigh the positions…. In a classroom environment, 
that’s often how I see my role when it gets to these value issues. 
Not to buy in to any one of the value systems, but be willing to 
raise a counter argument to whatever the issue is in order to 
explore why you are taking that position.” 
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This respondent has international authority with respect to science, science 
policy, and policy. Additionally, this respondent is expanding their career into 
more explicitly normative issues and is able to do so successfully because of their 
mediation skills. These value mediation skills are not so different from the science 
mediation skills required to build scientific credibility (i.e. evaluating hypotheses, 
accounting for variables, etc.). Though it is normal for scientists to use their 
science mediation skills in the classroom, it not as common for scientists to 
address the normative aspects of their science in the policy arena for fear of being 
labeled an advocate. But AES can act with environmental and scientific authority 
by developing their environmental and scientific credibility in the classroom 
meditating (and arbitrating) issues of science and values.  
This brings us back to the paradox. If objectivity is understood in the 
positivist sense, then the relationship between environmental values and 
environmental credibility is opposed to the integrity of science perceived by the 
larger society. To be clear, sharing common positive environmental values builds 
environmental credibility and the environmental authority that follows. Not 
sharing these values undermines this type of credibility. Additionally, acting on 
environmental values in a way that appears to be “advocacy, or worse, activism” 
(as shared in the boardwalk quote) can quickly destroy scientific credibility and 
the scientific authority that follows. Given the literature reviewed in chapter two, 
how my respondents handled their career decisions with respect to 
environmentalism indicates that adopting a unidimensional approach (i.e. either 
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producing science or advocating policy) is inadequate on its own. But the method 
of using both invites conflict, and thus attention is necessitated. As one 
respondent explained,  
“I think a lot of scientists don’t even recognize when they are 
crossing the line [between scientist and citizen advocate]. They 
think that they are advocating something that is purely informed by 
their objective position as a scientist, when in fact it is being 
informed by their values. So we come back to the point of your 
research; we all need to be more self aware about what those 
distinctions are so we can more clearly and accurately state when 
we are behaving as scientists versus as citizens.”  
 
In the quote above environmentalism is an advocacy activity that 
individuals acting only citizens can engage in, but individuals acting as scientific 
experts cannot. If the communities are blending, that means drawing the line 
between appropriate and inappropriate advocacy activities is more difficult 
because it is now often drawn within rather than between persons. Another 
respondent offered a completely different view on what advocacy is and what it 
means for us as humans.  
“I think someone who is not an advocate for something, whatever 
it is, is going to be a pretty boring person. The trick is do you 
advocate or are you an activist about something that is directly 
associated with what you do every day for your job? … I think 
that if you sat down and talked with somebody but couldn’t find 
something they feel strongly enough about to be an activist given 
the opportunity, that person is going to be boring because that 
means they don’t have strong values or feelings about anything…. 
I think, fundamentally, if people tell you they are not activist in 
any way, shape or form, they either lying to you or they are 
really boring people…. Or they could be lying to themselves, 
which makes them doubly boring [laughs].” 
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My respondents evidenced a variety of views regarding the meanings of 
and relationships between advocacy and objectivity. Positivist objectivity appears 
to be common among my respondents. Some think it is real; other think it is 
ridiculous, worthy of suspicion, or not quite accurate because objectivity is a 
matter of degree. Regardless of whether they accept objectivity in this form, they 
do (reluctantly at times) accept that it is necessary for building scientific 
credibility. Scientific authority then rests on top of this credibility with the 
judicious use of arbitration on scientific matters.  
AES who attempt to use their authority on matters outside of their 
scientific expertise, as mentioned above, aren’t being objective because they are 
using their environmental credibility in place of or mixed with their scientific 
credibility. By acting outside the perceived appropriate limits of their expertise, 
the scientist risks being branded as not objective, and is reprimanded by 
tarnishing or losing their scientific credibility along with their authority. For 
some, there is a fear of the collateral damage of reducing the credibility of the 
environmental science community. As illustrated in chapter two, this is the fear 
voiced by at least some AES against advocacy, many of which are well published 
if not leaders. The typical response given by at least some respondents is to not 
give into the rigid positivist view; instead they argue AES should change the 
meaning of science to make objectivity useful but not unduly constraining.  
These complex relationships between fluctuating and loosely defined 
concepts are being strained by increased pressure on AES to inform and 
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sometimes shape environmental policy. Clearly these kinds of conversations need 
to take place in a more transparent and constructive manner, but as one 
respondent warned,  
“When we start to question the legitimacy of science, which… 
comes up when we start to talk about how scientists actually have 
values and those values influence the kind of questions she’s 
asking, this can be used as the thin edge of the wedge for the anti-
science group to come in and say, ‘see what I mean, this is all just 
bunk, this is just another liberal person with their liberal questions 
to come up with their science with an answer in order to take away 
our liberties.’” 
 
Many Postmodern arguments call the legitimacy of science into question 
by arguing that the knowledge generated through science is compromised because 
the standard of value-neutrality was breached. This is an illustrative example of 
how the problematic definition of positivist objectivity with its two meanings is 
used to make the “thin edge of the wedge” syllogism.  
P1: Traditional scientific objectivity requires both descriptive 
accuracy and value neutrality with respect to non-epistemic values 
P2: Scientific objectivity is required for building scientific 
credibility  
P3: Scientific credibility is required for building scientific 
authority 
C1: Therefore, if descriptive accuracy or value neutrality with 
respect to non-epistemic values is compromised, then scientific 
objectivity is compromised 
C2: Therefore, if scientific objectivity is compromised, then 
scientific credibility and scientific authority are compromised 
P4: Advocacy is value-laden work at least partially of the non-
epistemic kind 
C3: Therefore, engaging in advocacy results in C1 and C2 
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But if P1 is changed to “Scientific objectivity is a community practice 
where values, beliefs, and ideas are interrogated and reformed,” then C1, C2, and 
C3 are all neutralized and advocacy is no longer necessarily a harmful activity.  
Academia is one of, if not the primary institution for the production and 
housing of traditional science. Yet, due to the high degree to which academia is 
unregulated in the United States compared to other developed nations, it can 
perhaps change more rapidly (Crow, 2008). Many respondents expressed this 
view, but one gave it particular emphasis by evoking the vision of a president 
from a previous university. 
“Academia needs to take ‘ownership over the environmental 
challenge.’ As President [edit] once said, ‘We as universities like 
to stand back and point fingers at the woes of this world. Business 
did it. Government did it. Why do we as universities not take 
responsibility? Where did they get educated? Who taught them? 
Who is the them we are blaming?’” 
 
 
Engaging Policy  
“No policy decision can be made in the absence of understanding 
what we value, why we value it, why we value some things more 
than others. But scientists aren’t empowered to be the one who say 
what society should value.” 
 
Responses such as this invited the question of what AES are empowered 
to do in policy decision-making. My respondents believed that they should 
“inform” and “advise” policy-makers, not “advocate” or “tell people what they 
should value.” Many respondents expressed some version of the view that my 
first respondent predicted, “everyone is going to say that [is what] they do, 
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approximately, but I don’t think that’s necessarily right.” Another respondent 
echoed this point by explaining how there are actually different roles for different 
scientists. 
“I think there are multiple points of entry for environmental 
scientist to be associated with environmental policy and policy 
making. For some, which is the easiest, it’s what some people call 
the UPS model of science. Which is where you do your science, 
bundle it up, put it in a box, leave it on the loading dock, someone 
backs in, grabs it and takes it away. This has always been the hope 
of science. That the science would be packaged up by an 
objective scientist and the policy-makers would unpack it and 
decide what they can actually use to influence policy. For a lot 
of people, that’s the best they can do and the best they can hope 
for.  
 
But for other people, they are scientists that can get in from the 
beginnings of discussions of policy formation. So they can 
actually talk to the policy makers about what are the potential 
levers, what are the things that can actually be done, where is the 
bureaucracy just so fixed nothing is ever going to happen. So 
understanding the mechanisms of how policy is made in different 
kinds of milieu. There are some scientists that are good at doing 
that. I would say that they are in the vast minority probably.” 
 
This appears consistent with the findings of the three other dimensions. 
Science is a human endeavor and each person can only contribute within the 
limits of their abilities; there is no single way for environmental scientists to 
inform policy because there is no single type of environmental scientist. But some 
respondents on the frontiers of understanding environmental challenges offered 
views that well represent the changing pulse of their community.  
“Anything that isn’t fairly nimble and flexible is not going to 
succeed ultimately. I think science is pretty nimble and flexible, 
but it might need to [improve] in its interaction with social 
decision-making…. [Science] should inform the process. It has to 
and I think it always has. One of the problems in the past is there 
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was an overreliance on the presumption of accurate interpretation 
by nonscientists of that knowledge. What needs to become more 
prevalent in that informing process is the people who at least know 
the knowledge better, and preferably the people who generated that 
knowledge, need to be a part of that informing process.  
 
The practice of science is one of continuous change as discussed in 
chapter two. This quality makes science resilient, but also difficult to navigate 
because there aren’t any hardened rules for conduct. Rather, the guidelines are 
flexible to keep the practice nimble. So how can these scientists inform policy if 
there is an absence of clear and solid guidelines? Some respondents reported that 
doing more social and policy relevant research in addition to working directly 
with the decision-makers is an effective way to inform the policy decision-making 
process. For example, 
“With [large, career defining project], a big part of what we are 
moving towards is making the work more applied. And when I 
say ‘more applied,’ that doesn’t mean that we are necessarily the 
ones making the decisions—we’re not—but figuring out ways of 
studying the urban systems we are studying in a way that 
includes parameters that are more directly relevant to policy-
makers and to decisions-makers. And to the extent we can, 
involve them in the science we are doing. The coproduction of 
knowledge with the people that can actually use that knowledge to 
make better informed decisions.” 
 
Doing research to fill in the lacunas policy makers need to have addressed 
is a productive method of informing their decisions. The respondent in the quote 
above specifically includes the parameters that are relevant in an effort to do this. 
Another respondent elaborated a similar point, 
“If there is an actual management decision to be made, working 
with the people who are going to make the management decision is 
probably a good idea.... 
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[Because] getting an approximation to the right problem is 
probably better than getting an exact answer to an 
approximate problem. Spending time with people on the front 
lines dealing with the policy questions, you are much more likely 
to try to solve the right problem with an approximate solution than 
coming up with a solution to an approximate problem.” 
 
Further respondents focused on ways to help evaluate the science if given 
a defined set of values. For example, one respondent with federal policy 
experience stated, “I think scientists can play a role [by saying] ‘here is what you 
have said your values are, and here is, in fact, the reality’.” Pointing out 
inconsistencies was a valid and helpful way to informing policy for some 
respondents.  
“I do ‘positive analysis’ rather than ‘policy analysis’…. give me 
the objective and I’m not going to make statements about whether 
it’s right or wrong, but how to get there…. if you say ‘prioritize 
this way,’ I can give you an analysis. If you don’t like the analysis 
findings, you really weren’t prioritizing that way.” 
 
The respondent with federal policy experience commented on a different 
kind of inconsistency. Science has limits and although they are changing, policy-
makers ought not use the authority of science to make nonscientific decisions. 
“[Telling policy decision-makers] you can choose that because in 
this particular instance, the politics is way more important than the 
amount of carbon sequestered we are going to get, and you want to 
do it [for a particular reason], which is fine. But, don’t say you are 
doing it based on the fact that this is the biggest bang for our buck 
in terms of sequestering carbon. Science doesn’t defend you on 
that. You are making this assertion for nonscientific reasons. I 
felt like that was advice, not advocacy.” 
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Many respondents voiced concerns that policy could not be changed as 
quickly as they deemed necessary. One respondent emphasized this point 
throughout our interview, but did offer some semblance of hope.  
“It’s going to require—you hate to say that things are going to 
require generational changes because to some extent, there are 
storms looming on the horizon that suggest we may not have 
generations of time to make some truly transformative changes of 
how we do things on this planet. But this is a case where I think 
some generational change is already happening. Old gray hairs 
like me are going to be less willing to get out of their comfort zone 
and become part of this informing voice than young folks who 
have grown up learning science in the world of broader 
impacts, that they need to get out of the lab.” 
 
If time is indeed running out, then playing it safe inside one’s “comfort 
zones” isn’t safe. Many respondents spoke about how “one of the hallmarks of 
science is the continuation of change,” so what kind of change is happening in the 
current generation of these scientists? 
“I mean look at the prominent presidents of ESA. They are all 
about earth stewardship…. A lot of prominent scientists are 
there are saying that we need to be better stewards of the 
planet. Doing it later in their career, which I think is it safe for 
them. Because they establish themselves as strong scientists, just 
like pure scientists who do something more applied later in their 
career, and I think that’s a safe position because they are 
working within the system to become credible and then using 
the credibility for something else, later.” 
 
The structural relationship and possible tensions between objectivity, 
environmental values, credibility, and authority in the decisions of AES are 
discussed throughout this thesis. The respondent in the quote above, who is a 
younger AES, is working with an understanding of these relationships and sees 
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how they constrain what career moves are safe for these scientists. But is this 
enough? Two specifically think it isn’t. One stated, 
“Terry Chapin, and now Stuart [sic] Pickett,28 is leading the charge 
on it [ESA], they’ve spun into this big initiative on 
environmental stewardship. I think that’s just another ‘s-word’ 
because they don’t want to say the real ‘s-word’ that is 
sustainability.” 
 
These two respondents expressed that because time is of the 
essence, the practice of AES must make “truly transformative changes,” 
and environmental stewardship is not transformative enough. 
Alternatively, sustainability science is for some seen as more promising 
here because of its problem solving orientation, its socio-ecological 
intergration, and its encouragement of scientists to actively address the 
normative human and social dimensions of their research. Such changes 
appear to be taking hold among some members of the community.  
[R] “I’ve seen some sea changes, at least with urban ecologists, when I first 
starting working… there were some ecologists that said “we can’t get into any 
kind of advocacy work, we can’t let policy need dictate what we are going to for 
research, we need to be objective.” 
[C] “What year was this?” 
[R] “About 2002, 2003. But since then… I’ve seen [how] this last round of [NSF] 
renewal grants include sustainability, doing scenarios, and talking about 
normative values. … This was a huge surprise; this was a fundamental shift in the 
ways that ecologists were thinking.” 
 
What caused this shift? Early in the interview process an older and well 
established respondent offered their explanation of the changes for when, why, 
                                                 
28
 Former and current ESA presidents as of this writing in June, 2012. 
(http://www.esa.org/history/officers.php) 
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and how ecology developed through the institutional leadership of ESA. They 
provided a short story to cover this development. 
“The ESA was formed and for many decades functioned as a 
society focused on doing the science of ecology. Victor Shelford 
got crossed when he wanted to take it in what we would now 
regard as sort of an environmental or conservation direction. If 
memory serves me correctly, there’s even a connection with the 
Nature Conservancy. So, you get those as very different 
traditions, of value systems really, in terms of ‘were you being 
a scientist, doing the science, or were you being and 
advocate.’29  
 
Shelford felt that ESA had to be more of an advocate for the 
natural places than it was being in the 40s and 50s. There was a 
division within the community. Those two strands, those two 
ways of thinking, come back together in the 90s. I would look 
to the Lubchenco report as a place where that group gets 
together those two traditions by making the case the ESA, 
what ecologists were doing, had to also play a role in policy.  
 
[They argued] that these were not contrarian views, but that they 
could be complementary. Yes, you can be a scientist, but you can 
still have your opinions as far as how environmental things 
handled—environmentalism, conservation, preservation—you 
just need to make it clear when you are talking as the scientist 
or the advocate. 
 
…. [T]he Lubchenco report—it really was the major shot 
across the bow for the ecologists to step up. The Washington 
Office of Public Policy emerges from that report, which signaled a 
willingness on the part of the Society to take positions on these 
kinds of issues…. I do think it anchors this kind of reason that 
shows how the ESA shifted from its historical position of ‘we’re 
independent, we’re outside the system, we provide advice,’ to one 
that where ‘we can provide advice, and in fact, we are in the very 
best position to provide this advice.’” 
 
                                                 
29
 See footnote #10 for a more detailed account of this history. See 
(Tjossem, 1994) for a more thorough account.  
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 This respondent has witnessed four decades of ecological science, but has 
not actively participated in ESA affairs. Another respondent interviewed is an 
ESA insider and has been since before the Lubchenco Report of 1991, more 
formally the Sustainable Biosphere Initiative or SBI (Lubchenco, et al., 1991). 
When I began eliciting this respondent’s insider opinions, they prefaced their 
responses with, “Since all my answers are anonymous…” This indicated again 
that, although some AES support increased demands for transparency of values, 
beliefs, and opinions, these are not yet full fledged (or not yet) consensus 
constitutive values among all AES. 
[C] “When do you think ESA made the transition from putting so much distance 
between ESA and advocacy, as seen when Victor Shelford was essentially forced 
to leave, to ESA has a fundamental responsibility to address policy questions?” 
[R] “I can tell you exactly when that happened.” 
[C] “When’s that?” 
[R] “It’s going to sound like a crazy answer. It was in 1991 when they published 
the Sustainable Biosphere Initiative…. That paper laid it right out there. You 
read that paper and it’s relevant today, it’s incredible. It’s an incredible document. 
And it was written by a team of sort of mid-career super luminary that has 
all the street cred necessary to write such a thing. It was an amazing thing to 
write and publishing it in Ecology and not as a white paper made a statement: this 
is important, we need to set priorities, we to think about relevancy, and we need to 
think about how to handle environmental challenges. That was a turning point for 
me, and for ESA…. It got a huge splash. I’m sure there were a lot of ecologists 
who got freaked out by it…. It actually had an amplifying affect across 
societies by changing the way people thought to make it relevant.” 
 
According to some of the AES I interviewed, Terry Chapin and Stewart 
Pickett waited until they were late in the career and in secure positions of 
authority as president of ESA to strongly support environmental stewardship. Jane 
Lubchenco and her “super luminary” team were mid-career, but still had enough 
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credibility to publish one of the most important documents in AES, one that 
appears to have had ramifications for the AES research agenda as well as the 
funding priorities for scientific research.  Indeed, one respondent with insider 
information about why The National Science Foundation decided to change one 
of its research grant evaluative criteria to “Broader Impacts” in 199730 cited SBI 
as a main motivator. The SBI report encouraged AES to realize their work needed 
to be socially relevant and applied to find solutions. One of the ways this could be 
done was through a research emphasis on sustainability. Going back to chapter 
two’s discussion of institutional and organization environments and the question 
of how institutional environments change, I believe this example of SBI 
influencing some of evaluative criteria of publicly funded science in America is 
an example of how institutions can cause significant lateral change.  
So what is advocacy? The profile of Engaging Policy in chapter three 
explained that this question is threaded through the other three profiles of 
Motivations for Being an Academic Environmental Scientist, The Conditions of 
Academic Conditioning, and Objectivity, Credibility, and Authority. The simple 
answer provided by many of the respondents is summed up as “advocates are… 
those who are driven by claims that are not transparent and/or not backed up by a 
set of facts.” This implies that values are contributing to decisions elusively and 
therefore scientists as advocates are behaving inappropriately due to the now 
well-established problematic and entrenched positivist objectivity. 
                                                 
30
 http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100526/full/465416a.html  
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“Advocacy is the movement away from objectivity, because … 
[a]dvocacy is a missionary effort of convincing others that the 
values you hold should be of value to them. I don’t think it’s an 
inherently bad thing, but because of what I said before, that it 
moves away from objectivity and we hold objectivity of such high 
value, then we’re saying that person is an advocate therefore 
their science is not objective, pure, this or that. I think that’s 
really goofy, because are all advocates.” 
 
The post-positivist meaning of objectivity seems to resonate with a portion 
of respondents as indicated by the different views of objectivity in my 
respondents. This is happening as advocacy is also becoming more acceptable. 
One respondent who is an active educator, researcher, and administrator 
commented, 
“I think there has been a shift in the degree to which people are 
willing to engage in policy and advocacy than there were before. 
How many people are doing that, I don’t know.” 
 
As discussed above, the Sustainable Biosphere Initiative appears to have 
had a ripple effect through out AES.  But we may still ask what are the specific 
responsibilities of scientists? In 1997, Lubchenco became the president of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the world’s 
largest scientific organization (Lubchenco, 1998). Her presidential address 
“Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social Contract for Science” 
was an attempt to further incite social responsibility within professional science. 
The ESA insider respondent and I talked about how well Lubchenco’s speech and 
her following publication were received.  
[C] “What about Jane Lunchenco’s 1998 paper “A New Social 
Contract for Science,” did that have the same impact [as SBI]? 
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[R] “No, I don’t think it had the same impact at all…. People read it 
and thought, ‘Oh, that’s nice, but I don’t have a social contract, I am 
free to do whatever I want. I’m an academic.’ I think today more and 
more people are turning back and referring to that and saying that in fact 
we do have a social contract; we have an obligation to the public. They are 
paying our way, right? How many of us work for public universities? 
Where does that money come from? I think more people realize this 
now and see that we do have a social contract…. People were afraid. 
They thought if priorities were set, what they do wouldn’t be relevant…. I 
don’t think a lot of people want to admit that.” 
 
 In summary, respondents reported various definitions of and positions 
toward policy advocacy. Objectivity, Credibility, and Authority showed how 
these respondents also do not have a common definition of or attitude toward 
objectivity. These data help explain why advocacy is treated as tantamount to 
being a subjective science by many AES interviewed, but seen as a necessarily 
human thing by other AES who seemed to take a more post-positivist position on 
the question. The latter appear to agree that academic environmental scientists 
have the capacity to inform policy. What’s more, they also seem to agree that they 
ought to do so, and there are many ways to for scientists to tailor their approach. 
Lastly, I believe that my respondents’ views that policy engagement among AES 
is increasingly prevalent in academia are partly explained by ESA’s SBI. It seems 
this is the case because of the asserted influence of SBI on NSF’s funding 
decisions directed what research is done in academia towards social and policy 
relevancy. Although I am not claiming that other factors did not play a role in 
NSF’s adoption of the “Broader Impacts” criterion in evaluating research 
proposals, ESA’s pivot toward sustainability and social engagement—marked by 
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the SBI in the early 1990s—appears to have had some influence on research 
policy, at least according to some of the well-positioned AES I spoke with. 
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Chapter 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
Simple as it may sound, change takes time. Environmentalism has a longer 
history than discussed in this thesis, but the brief history presented here illustrates 
fundamental changes in perspectives underpinning changes in practices and 
philosophical foundations. This is especially salient with respect to sustainability 
because it is seen by many of the AES interviewed here as transforming the more 
or less exhausted practice of social environmental advocacy and activism through 
the professionalization of policy-relevant environmental science. 
The practice and conceptual foundations of science changed slowly over 
time, too. This is seen in the complete reversion of objectivity since the fourteenth 
century, how it now dominates the epistemic values of science, and how it relates 
to credibility and authority. These shifts in conceptual understanding are 
reflections of the larger shifts in science, notably from positivism to post-
positivism (see table 5-1) and address the influence of non-epistemic values, 
particularly environmental values, to help embed science into its human and 
social context. But the time between such shifts is often characterized by conflict 
and confusion. The AES I interviewed (as well as those participating in the policy 
advocacy debates in the literature discussed earlier) illustrate this conflicted 
position toward advocacy. When people hold different ideas of what objectivity 
is, a different view of what advocacy is and its permissibility follows. The 
diversity of positions towards policy engagement and the meaning of advocacy 
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found in my sociological study of nineteen AES provide empirical grounding for 
these tensions and confusions. 
 
Table 5-1 Respondents’ Views of Objectivity Expanded 
Objectivity is 
value neutrality 
and descriptive 
accuracy as 
practiced by 
individuals. 
(positivism) 
Why? Objectivity is a 
community practice 
where values, 
beliefs, and ideas are 
interrogated and 
reformed (post-
positivism) 
Why? 
It’s real and 
necessary 
To protect 
science’s 
credibility and 
authority 
It’s real, necessary, 
and comes in 
degrees 
Keeping the 
normative 
variables 
unaddressed 
results in 
inaccurate 
science. 
It’s ridiculous Science is a 
human 
endeavor 
It’s suspicious 
Not quite, it comes 
in degrees 
 
AES’ public funding constraints and society’s environmental constraints 
have motivated more scientists to act in accordance with a social contract within 
the last decade. Academia’s constraints include attempting to adapt to these lateral 
influences. With the institutional change of academia comes the organizational 
change of each university, which is one of the most central places for exchanging 
ideas for these scientists. But again, change takes time. And such transitions bring 
diversity of opinions and even confusion along with them. One respondent gave a 
response that embodies the kind of thoughtful relationships that this thesis 
explores.  
“I do think we have a fundamental responsibility to be active 
members of society. Not just in terms of being citizens… but in 
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terms of engaging society with our knowledge and our science—
where it is applicable—and to the extent we are comfortable. And 
that last term is so incredibly squishy, that it allows pretty much 
anything.” 
 
This thesis’s intention is empirical discovery. I believe one pattern found 
in my respondent data (see table 5-2) indicates a potential method for dealing with 
some of the issues raised. It seems to be the case that the AES I interviewed treat 
students and policy decision-makers in parallel. Consequentially, AES can 
practice their ability to mediate environmental issues with normative and 
scientific dimensions by building their environmental and scientific credibility. 
This in combination with a post-positivist understanding of objectivity offers one 
way to break out of the paradox discussed in chapter four. One respondent was 
able to integrate the two forms of credibility and use the resultant new form of 
authority without conflict.  
 
Table 5-2 AES’ Parallel Treatment of Students and Policy Decision-Makers  
Should 
scientists… 
Subject x  Students Policy decision-
makers 
…inform x of science? Yes Yes 
…decide x’s values? No No 
…evaluate science with x 
to match given social 
values? 
Only if mediation skills are strong, which isn’t 
for everyone. Science needs more this type of 
scientist. 
 
Respondents expressed desire to more actively and effectively engage in 
environmental policy decision-making but were reluctant to compromise their 
scientific credibility and some were additionally unsure how to find the time to 
invest in the personal changes seen as necessary for policy engagement. This 
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thesis indicates that AES are able to work towards meeting their desires and 
building their tool set of working with values by utilizing the social learning 
environment of the classroom. An additional benefit of discussing the normative 
dimensions of environmental science cited by respondents is this helps train the 
next generation of AES practitioners, policy-makers, and citizens in general to 
better appreciate the roles of value in science and the role of science in society. 
A second pattern is that the recent and ongoing changes in the practices 
and conceptual foundations of environmentalism and academic science could 
potentially help ameliorate some of the tensions and confusion AES face, such as 
the meaning and use of environmental values, objectivity, and policy advocacy. 
They have the potential to successfully integrate their two sets of contextual 
(environmental advocacy and scientific behavior guided by epistemic values) and 
constitutive values (change policy and contribute to science). Yet, this is clearly 
not the case as seen in the policy advocacy debates. The two sets of contextual 
and constitutive values initially invite conflict—as explained by advocacy’s 
relationship to objectivity—but diffusing this tension is possible as shown by 
analyzing my respondent data. This is possible because the changes in the practice 
and philosophy of science in AES offer a stimulus for constructively integrating 
the disparate value sets for AES. 
This is seen in the differences of social and policy relevant science across 
generations of AES practitioners. AES I interviewed who were trained in the 
1960s and 1970s shied away from societal application because of its association 
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with environmental advocacy, but are engaging policy in alternative ways (or at 
least desiring to) now later in the careers. The younger generation was more likely 
to be originally trained this way, and the next generation is more likely to be 
exposed to societal application, sustainability, and the questions of informing 
policy. This also seems to be linked to the pattern of how colleagues rarely talk 
about their personal motivations for their research, yet these scientists are 
increasingly having these conversations with students in the classroom.  
Even though some accounts of advocacy are thought of as permissible and 
even unavoidable, the move from “advocacy” to “informing” seems to help 
preserve the entrenched relationships between objectivity, credibility, and 
authority. This is understandable given the transition academic science is going 
through and the concern that these changes could jeopardize the credibility and 
authority of science if not handled with caution. Matching this caution is the 
urgency demanded of political action and the need for scientists to be transparent 
about their values. My interviews with AES in this study suggest that cultural 
environmental values are for them contextual values, and that ensuring the 
continuance of supportive, regulatory, and provisional environmental values 
through the informing of policy and citizenry are held as constitutive values. The 
constitutive values are recognized by the AES I spoke with as more acceptable  
than the contextual values, perhaps because cultural environmental values are 
non-epistemic and therefore perceived to conflict with certain notions of 
objectivity.  
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But post-positivist objectivity seems to be able to account for the 
contextual cultural environmental values if subject to a sort of value peer review 
system discussed in chapter two and in Objectivity, Credibility, and Authority. 
The scientific mediation skills of scientists can expand to include value mediation 
skills. And if practiced, scientific and environmental credibility can integrate and 
build authority beyond the limited scientific authority. AES already have the 
ability to do this (i.e. they were trained to have scientific mediation skills) plus the 
space and time to practice (i.e. in the classroom and eventually with policy 
decision-makers). 
AES are in transition between recognizing the human and social 
dimensions of science and integrating them into their institutions. I conclude that 
it is helpful to understand how environmental values function in the motives and 
decisions of AES given that these scientists are realizing through their roles as 
educators, scientists, administrators, and policy informers that the normative 
dimensions of science must be actively handled. Furthermore, this is within 
reasonable reach. The submission to positivist objectivity trained into the 
currently practicing AES is weakening with the rising critiques of post-positivism, 
but the benefits of objectivity are kept intact so far as these scientists can 
transparently discuss and reform their values. The interrogation of the contextual 
and constitutive values must be handled as actively as possible to integrate the 
roles of environmental values in the human and social dimension of AES.  
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1) The role of metaphors in the AES community. 
2) Assessing the role of nostalgia in the contextual and constitutive environmental 
values of the AES community. 
3) The intrinsic versus instrumental environmental value debate, and, how this is 
perhaps reflected in the value systems of conservation biology and ecology. 
4) How degrees of uncertainty affect degrees of objectivity. 
5) The basic versus applied false dichotomy (i.e. Stokes, 1997). 
6) The finer differences between politics and policy, and their implications for advocacy 
in the AES community.  
7) The scientization of politics and the politicization of science. 
8) Technocracy of scientific rationalism and its authority in politics.  
9) Pielke’s (2007) “science arbiter” is his “honest broker” if the arbiter effectively uses 
mediation skills for values in policy decision-making.  
10) The role of funding in relation to social responsibility in science.  
11) Division of labor between and within institutions.  
12) Maslov’s hierarchy in relation to the MA framework 
 
 
 
